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STATE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS 
AND CORPORATE LAW: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
JENS DAMMANN* 
ABSTRACT 
Unlike reincorporation decisions, domestic relocations of corporate 
headquarters have not yet received any attention in the corporate law 
literature.  This lack of interest is unsurprising.  Under the so-called 
“internal affairs doctrine,” a corporation’s internal affairs are governed by 
the state of incorporation, meaning that the location of a firm’s headquarters 
is irrelevant to corporate law. 
However, this traditional approach has begun to change.  In 2018, 
California became the first state to adopt a gender quota for corporate 
boards.  Importantly, the scope of application of this statute is determined by 
the location of a corporation’s principal executive offices rather than by its 
state of incorporation.  Several other states are now considering similar 
legislation. 
For corporate law theory and policy, this deviation from the internal 
affairs rule is nothing less than the potential beginning of a tectonic shift.  To 
the extent that the state of the headquarters governs a corporation’s internal 
affairs, it is the relocation of a firm’s headquarters rather than a firm’s 
reincorporation that leads to a change in the applicable corporate law.  The 
result is an entirely new dimension of state competition in corporate law; 
charter competition will likely remain the dominant factor, but states’ 
attempts to lure corporate headquarters may now also shape corporate law.  
This Article lays the groundwork for a discussion of this new and more 
complex type of state competition by providing a detailed empirical analysis 
of firms’ relocation choices.  Relying on a dataset spanning twenty-five years 
(1994–2018), I show that headquarters relocations from one state to another 
are by no means uncommon.  I also present evidence that the legal 
environment appears to be driving relocation choices at least to some extent.  
These findings suggest that state competition for corporate headquarters may 
well begin to have an impact on state corporate law. 
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In 2018, California became the first U.S. state to mandate a gender quota 
for the boards of publicly traded corporations.1  California law now requires 
publicly-traded corporations with principal offices located in California to 
have a minimum number of female directors.2  This reform rightly attracted 
 
 1. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2020).  This provision was added to the California 
Code by S.B. 826 and took effect on January 1, 2019.  See S.B. 826, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2018).  By the end of 2019, publicly traded corporations whose principal offices are located in 
California were required to have at least one female director.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a)–(b) 
(West 2020). 
 2. The exact number of female directors required depends on the size of the board.  Boards 
with six or more directors must have at least three female directors, boards with five directors must 
have at least two female directors, and boards with four or fewer directors must have at least one 
female director.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(b) (West 2020). 
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substantial attention in both the media3 and the corporate law literature.4  The 
statute’s enactment not only highlighted the dramatic underrepresentation of 
women on corporate boards5 but also opened a new battleground in the fight 
for gender equality by enlisting corporate governance as an instrument to 
help women shatter the glass ceiling in corporate management.6 
California’s gender quota statute is also remarkable for an entirely 
different reason.  Rather than focusing on a corporation’s place of 
incorporation, it covers publicly-traded corporations that have “principal 
executive offices” located in California, regardless of where they are 
incorporated.7  While this may seem like a minor technical detail, California’s 
decision to tie its gender quota to a firm’s principal executive offices rather 
than its place of incorporation amounts to a fundamental break from one of 
U.S. corporate law’s most hallowed principles, the so-called internal affairs 
rule.8   
 
 3. E.g., Alejandro Lazo, U.S. News: Gov. Brown Signs a Batch of Laws, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 
2018, at A3; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Diversify the Boardroom, Just Not Like California, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 2, 2018, at B1. 
 4. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Gender Diversity, Diversity Fatigue, and Shifting the Focus, 
87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1061, 1076–77 (2019) (listing gender quotas as one of several measures 
advocated by those who seek more gender diversity in corporate boardrooms); Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Me, Too and #MeToo: Women in Congress and the Boardroom, 87 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1079, 1087 (2019) (viewing California’s gender quota in the context of the #metoo 
movement); Darren Rosenblum & Yaron Nili, Board Diversity by Term Limits?, 71 ALA. L. REV. 
211, 214–15 (2019) (summarizing the new California statute in the context of their analysis of term 
limits for corporate directors as a way to increase board diversity); Darren Rosenblum, California 
Dreaming?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (2019) (arguing that “despite its many flaws, the quota 
may succeed in curbing male over-representation on corporate boards”); Cindy A. Schipani & Terry 
Morehead Dworkin, The Need for Mentors in Promoting Gender Diverse Leadership in the #MeToo 
Era, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1272, 1297 (2019) (discussing the California gender quota in the 
broader context of promoting diverse leadership); Ben Taylor, Note, Why California Senate Bill 826 
and Gender Quotas Are Unconstitutional: Shareholder Activism as a Better Path to Gender 
Equality in the Boardroom, 18 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 117 (2019) (arguing that the California quota 
statute violates the U.S. Constitution). 
 5. Cf., e.g., ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY & DELOITTE, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018 
BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 17 (2019), 
https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/missing_pieces_report_01152019_final.pdf 
(reporting that as of 2018, women accounted for 22.5 percent of corporate directors at Fortune 500 
companies); Jens Dammann, Place Aux Dames: The Ideological Divide Between U.S. and European 
Gender Discrimination Laws, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25, 71 (2012) (noting that as of 2010, only 
about sixteen percent of corporate directors at Fortune 500 companies were women). 
 6. This is true, at least, with respect to the United States.  While California was the first U.S. 
state to adopt a gender quota for corporate boards, various European countries had already taken 
this step.  See, e.g., id. at 71–73 (describing gender quota legislation in Belgium, France, Norway, 
and Spain). 
 7. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(b) (West 2020). 
 8. There is widespread agreement that the internal affairs rule is of fundamental importance 
to U.S. corporate law.  See, e.g., Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. 
L. REV. 339, 340 (2018) (asserting that “[t]he internal affairs doctrine is the foundation on which 
modern corporate law is built”).  On the fact that California’s board quota represents a partial 
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Under the internal affairs rule, it is the law of the state of incorporation 
that governs a corporation’s internal affairs.9  As a result, entrepreneurs are 
free to choose the corporate law they prefer by incorporating in the state of 
their choice.10  Should they later want to change their choice, they can easily 
reincorporate.11  This freedom of choice is at the heart of what is known as 
the market for corporate charters.12  States can compete for corporate charters 
by making their corporate law attractive to corporations.13  To the extent that 
they succeed, states gain additional revenue by way of the fees that 
corporations pay for the privilege of being incorporated in the particular 
state.14 
Of course, many questions involving the charter market remain highly 
controversial.  For example, do states compete for corporate charters by 
making their law more shareholder-friendly, as many scholars believe,15 or 
do they seek to attract firms by pandering to managers?16  Does regulatory 
competition benefit shareholders, or would shareholders be better off if the 
U.S. Congress intervened and federalized substantial parts of corporate 
 
departure from the internal affairs doctrine see Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, 
California’s ‘Women on Boards’ Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, 20 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 493 (2019). 
 9. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
 10. Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 
477, 478, 487 (2004). 
 11. Id. at 478.  Corporate law offers two different ways of reincorporating from one state to 
another.  The traditional way is to form a subsidiary corporation in the desired state of incorporation 
and then merge the old corporation into the subsidiary.  However, many states now allow foreign 
corporations to become domestic corporations by filing a certificate of conversion.  E.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 265 (West 2020). 
 12. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343, 392 
(2011) (pointing out that the internal affairs doctrine has made the market for corporate charters 
possible). 
 13. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 225, 235–65 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Product]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 847 (1993) (concluding that existence of the charter market benefits 
investors “on balance”); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and 
Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 177–79 (1992) (stressing the charter market’s potential to 
benefit stockholders); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 389 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Securities 
Regulation] (noting that regulatory competition in corporate had remarkable success in producing 
“a regime that, on balance, benefits shareholders”). 
 16. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race 
to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170 (1999) (arguing that 
regulatory competition is “likely to produce troubling results with respect to some critical aspects 
of corporate law”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and 
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 161–62 (2001) (arguing that the corporate charter 
market causes states to offer managers an inefficiently high level of protection against takeovers). 
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law?17  And how many states compete?  Do most states make efforts to attract 
corporate charters, or do most jurisdictions remain on the sidelines, content 
to let a few select states—such as Delaware and Nevada—battle for corporate 
charters?18  Moreover, to what extent do additional factors, such as network 
effects or homogeneity benefits,19 play a role in firms’ incorporation 
choices?20   
While all these questions continue to generate discussion among 
corporate scholars, most voices in the literature seem to agree on one fact: 
regulatory competition, made possible by the internal affairs rule, is a crucial 
feature of U.S. corporate law.21  Therefore, firms’ incorporation and 
 
 17. Most scholars seem to oppose further federal interventions in the area of corporate law.  
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate 
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 782 (2013) (arguing that “members of Congress should resist 
the temptation to interfere with Delaware lawmaking”).  However, some scholars cautiously take a 
more benign view of federal intervention.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal 
Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1794–95 (2006) (arguing that 
“federal officials should proactively and systematically review all corporate law areas now governed 
by state law to determine which ones should be fully or at least partly federalized”).  For a detailed 
account of how the federal law has progressively taken over large swaths of what was once, or is 
still, considered corporate law see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 
607–34 (2003) (tracing the history of federal interventions in the area of corporate law). 
 18. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 679, 748–49 (2002) (arguing that Delaware is alone among U.S. states in making 
active efforts to attract public corporations).  But see Romano, Securities Regulation, supra note 15, 
at 507–13 (arguing that states are also typically involved in “‘defensive’ competition” in that they 
try to keep locally headquartered firms from incorporating out of state). 
 19. Jens Dammann, Homogeneity Effects in Corporate Law, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1103, 1105–06 
(2014) (distinguishing homogeneity benefits from network benefits and arguing that homogeneity 
benefits can explain various features of U.S. and European Union corporate law that network theory 
cannot explain). 
 20. The first scholar to suggest that network benefits play an important role in explaining 
Delaware’s dominance in the charter market was Michael Klausner.  See Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 842–47 (1995) 
(showing why network benefits may be one important factor in explaining Delaware’s success).  
Many scholars now argue that network benefits contribute to Delaware’s success in the charter 
market.  E.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594 (2003); Michal 
Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 127, 142, 
146 (2004); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1923–24 (1998) [hereinafter Kamar, Indeterminacy].  But see Henry 
Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (arguing that network 
theory may overstate firms’ demand for legal uniformity); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, 
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 570 (1998) (questioning 
the practical importance of network benefits in corporate law). 
 21. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: 
Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1797 
(2002) (categorizing the question of whether regulatory competition produces a race to the top or 
the bottom as “[o]ne of the most important questions in U.S. corporate law”). 
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reincorporation choices have long been a primary focus of American and 
international corporate law scholarship.22 
By contrast, corporate law scholars have paid no attention to firms’ 
ability to move their headquarters from one U.S. state to another.23  This lack 
of interest is unsurprising.  Under the internal affairs rule, a publicly traded 
corporation’s decision to relocate its headquarters from one state to another 
does not change the applicable corporate law, which continues to be 
 
 22. There now exists a well-developed body of empirical research exploring the incorporation 
choices of publicly traded corporations in the United States.  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 421 (2003) (analyzing 
the incorporation choices of IPO firms and providing evidence that states adopting a greater number 
of antitakeover statutes tend to attract more corporations); Marcel Kahan, The Demand for 
Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 340, 363 (2006) (analyzing the incorporation choices of IPO firms and finding that the 
flexibility of a state’s corporate law regime is positively correlated with success in the charter 
market).  The literature has also analyzed the incorporation choices of closely held firms.  See, e.g., 
Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held Corporations, 
27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 84–85 (2011) (demonstrating that most privately held corporations 
incorporate either locally or in Delaware; and identifying features of corporate law that are 
positively correlated with success in the charter market). 
 23. That does not mean that firms’ decisions where to locate their headquarters have entirely 
escaped empirical scrutiny.  Economists, most notably those focusing on what is known as regional 
economics, have long analyzed firms’ decisions where to direct their investments.  As a result, 
various studies have examined firms’ original location decisions.  See, e.g., Peter Egger, Doina 
Radulescu & Nora Strecker, Effective Labor Taxation and the International Location of 
Headquarters, 20 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 631, 631 (2013) (using a dataset including 35,206 firms 
from 120 countries to assess the impact of labor taxation on the choice of headquarters location); J. 
Vernon Henderson & Yukako Ono, Where Do Manufacturing Firms Locate Their Headquarters?, 
63 J. URB. ECON. 431, 431 (2008) (analyzing the headquarters-location choices of manufacturing 
firms in the United States).  Firms’ relocation choices have attracted much less attention, and the 
empirical studies focusing on relocation choices typically concentrate on firms’ choices where to 
locate their manufacturing establishments rather than their headquarters.  See, e.g., Miguel C. 
Manjón-Antolín & Josep-Maria Arauzo-Carod, Locations and Relocations: Determinants, 
Modelling, and Interrelations, 47 ANNALS REG’L SCI. 131, 131 (2011) (focusing on the relocation 
of manufacturing establishments between different municipalities within Catalonia, Spain).  A few 
studies deal with headquarters locations.  However, most of them focus on relocations from one 
country to another.  See, e.g., Johannes Voget, Relocation of Headquarters and International 
Taxation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1067, 1067 (2011) (examining the role of taxation as a determinant of 
multinational companies’ decision to move their headquarters across international borders); Tomi 
Laamanen, Tatu Simula & Sami Torstila, Cross-Border Relocations of Headquarters in Europe, 43 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 187, 187 (2012) (using a dataset of fifty-two cross-border headquarters 
relocations in Europe to analyze the determinants of such relocation choices, including taxation and 
employment rates); Marc G. Baaij, Tom J.M. Mom, Frans A.J. Van den Bosch & Henk W. 
Volberda, Why Do Multinational Corporations Relocate Core Parts of Their Corporate 
Headquarters Abroad?, 48 LONG RANGE PLAN. 46, 46 (2015) (analyzing the determinants of firms’ 
decisions to move parts of their headquarters to foreign countries).  Other studies focus on the 
within-country relocations, but focus on countries other than the United States.  See, e.g., Kristin 
Kronenberg, Firm Relocations in the Netherlands: Why Do Firms Move, 
and Where Do They Go?, 92 PAPERS REG’L SCI. 691, 691 (2013) (reexamining firms’ relocation 
choices within the Netherlands).   
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determined by the corporation’s state of incorporation.24  For example, if a 
publicly-traded Delaware corporation moves its principal place of business 
from Texas to Florida, the firm’s internal affairs remain subject to Delaware 
corporate law.25  Traditionally, therefore, the internal affairs doctrine 
rendered headquarters relocations within the United States irrelevant to 
corporate law.  
Of course, there have long existed certain modest exceptions to the 
internal affairs doctrine.  The state corporate laws of both New York and 
California traditionally include so-called pseudo-foreign corporation statutes 
that apply certain aspects of New York or California corporate law to firms 
that are incorporated elsewhere but do most of their business in New York or 
California.26  However, these statutes explicitly exempt corporations whose 
shares are listed on national securities exchanges.27 
Consequently, California’s gender quota statute, which focuses on the 
location of a firm’s principal executive offices rather than on the place of 
incorporation, amounts to a fundamental shift in the law, not just from the 
perspective of discrimination law, but also with a view to regulatory 
competition in corporate law.28  As a result, domestic relocations to and from 
California now have a direct impact on the applicable corporate law.   
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that California will remain an 
outlier in this regard.  Several other states, such as Hawaii,29 Massachusetts,30 
 
 24. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (holding that the “internal affairs 
doctrine” is a conflict of laws principle that “recognizes that only one State should have the authority 
to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between 
the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a 
corporation could be faced with conflicting demands”).  
 25. As opposed to domestic relations, defined as relocations from one U.S. state to another, 
firms’ international relocations have attracted substantial attention.  Unlike the United States, most 
countries take a corporation’s principal place of business into account in determining the 
corporation’s residence for tax purposes.  See Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the 
Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1661 (2015).  Accordingly, 
relocating a corporation’s headquarters from one country to another, can change the corporations’ 
tax residence status. 
 26. In California, the Corporations Code lists the various provisions applicable to pseudo-
foreign corporations.  See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2020).  In New York, different provisions 
in the Business Corporation Law provide that they apply to pseudo-foreign corporations.  See N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1316(e) (governing voting trust records), 1317(a)(1) (governing the liability of 
directors and officers), 1318 (governing the liability for disclosure failures), 1319(a)(4) (governing 
various other provisions) (McKinney 2000).  For a detailed analysis of these statutes and their 
constitutionality see Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: 
Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 59 MO. L. REV. 569 (1994). 
 27. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(c) (West 2000); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1320 (McKinney 2000). 
 28. See supra note 1. 
 29. Relating to Gender Equity, H.B. 2720, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2020). 
 30. Resolutions Encouraging Equitable and Diverse Gender Representation on the Boards of 
Companies in the Commonwealth, S. Res. 1007, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015). 
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Michigan,31 New Jersey,32 and Washington,33 are now considering quota 
bills, as well.  Furthermore, state legislation focusing on a corporation’s 
principal executive offices rather than its place of incorporation may not 
remain limited to board quotas.  For example, Senators Elizabeth Warren and 
Bernie Sanders have proposed reforms that would give employees of large 
corporations a voice in electing corporate directors.34  If individual states 
rather than the U.S. Congress were to implement these reforms, the pertinent 
legislation would have to focus on the corporation’s headquarters to prevent 
regulatory arbitrage.35  Therefore, California’s gender quota may mark the 
 
 31. Business Corporation Act, S.B. 115, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019). 
 32. See S.B. 3469, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019). 
 33. Increasing Equitable Gender Representation on Corporate Boards, S.B. 5142, 66th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). 
 34. Senator Elizabeth Warren has introduced the Accountable Capitalism Act, which applies to 
corporations with gross receipts exceeding one billion dollars, and allows a corporation’s employees 
to elect forty percent of corporate directors.  Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. 
(2018).  Senator Bernie Sanders has proposed legislation that would apply to corporations that are 
publicly traded or that have revenues or assets of at least one hundred million dollars.  Employees 
at these firms would elect forty-five percent of their corporation’s members. Bernie Sanders, 
Corporate Accountability and Democracy, https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-
accountability-and-democracy/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).  For an analysis of the economic costs 
and benefits that mandatory codetermination would have in the United States see Jens Dammann & 
Horst Eidenmüller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations, COL. BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021).  For an account of the benefits that codetermination may have for the protection 
of democratic institutions against excessive corporate power see Jens Dammann & Horst 
Eidenmüller, Taming the Corporate Leviathan: Codetermination and the Democratic State (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst. L. Working Paper No. 536/2020, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680769. 
 35. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has not yet defined the term “principal 
executive offices,” that the California statute refers to.  William J. Moon, Delaware’s New 
Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1425 n.103 (2020).  Against this background, it has been 
suggested that may be able to abuse this shortcoming to manipulate the location of their principal 
executive offices.  Id.  This line of reasoning, if taken at face value, might suggest that corporate 
law rules tied to the location of firms’ principal executive offices might be easy to avoid.  However, 
this logic would be misguided on several counts.  To begin, even if corporations were able to 
manipulate the location of their principal executive offices this would hardly suffice to frustrate 
California’s gender quota policy.  California could simply amend its statute and replace the term 
“principal executive offices” with the term “place of business” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).  
The U.S. Supreme Court defines the term “place of business” as “the place where the corporation’s 
high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities,” that is, its “nerve 
center.”  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010) (citing Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal 
Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. 
Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Weinfeld, J.)).  But even state laws use the term “principal 
executive offices,” there is little reason to fear that this term will lack bite.  The fact that the SEC 
has failed to define the meaning of the term “principal executive offices” does not imply that firms 
are free to apply their own definitions; rather, it is up to the courts to define this term.  And there is 
every reason to think that courts will rise to this challenge and rein in attempts at manipulation.  For 
example, in Desta v. Wins Finance, a federal district court denied a motion to dismiss against a 
Chinese firm that had allegedly misrepresented the location of its principal executive offices in order 
to be eligible for inclusion in the Russell 2000. Desta v. Wins Fin. Holdings Inc., No. 2:17-cv-
02983-CAS-AGR, 2018 WL 7458639, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2018). 
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beginning of an age in which the law governing a corporation’s internal 
affairs is a combination of the law of the state of incorporation and the law 
of the headquarters state. 
This change has important theoretical and practical implications.  As a 
matter of corporate law theory, even partial adoption of a rule determining 
the applicable corporate law based on the location of a corporation’s 
headquarters—a principle known as the real seat rule36—opens up a new 
dimension in which state competition impacts corporate law.  In the future, 
states’ efforts to attract or retain corporate headquarters may have a direct 
impact on state corporate law.  For example, some states may shy away from 
adopting gender quotas or other corporate law norms that aim to protect 
employees for fear of causing corporations to relocate their headquarters 
elsewhere.   
On a policy level, the interplay between headquarters-based corporate 
law and corporate relocations is equally essential.  Those who find specific 
headquarters-based rules such as the California gender quota statute desirable 
may wonder whether firms’ ability to relocate their headquarters threatens to 
undermine the quota’s effectiveness.  On the other hand, those who fear that 
states will use their regulatory authority over locally headquartered firms to 
impose inefficient rules may wonder if a firms’ ability to relocate can provide 
a useful check on the headquarters state’s power. 
Crucially, the relevance of these theoretical and policy concerns 
depends, in large part, on empirical issues.  For example, if, in practice, firms 
very rarely change the location of their headquarters, then there is little reason 
to assume that state competition for corporate headquarters will have any 
impact on state corporate law.  Furthermore, in that case, there is no need to 
be concerned that firms will evade real-seat-based corporate law by moving 
their headquarters elsewhere. 
Therefore, this Article provides a much-needed empirical analysis of 
domestic state-to-state relocation choices.  Combining various datasets on 
publicly traded corporations, corporate mergers, and states’ regulatory and 
tax environments, this Article presents a detailed analysis of relocation 
 
 36. It is worth noting that the exact definition of what constitutes a corporation’s real seat varies.  
See, e.g., Clark D. Stith, Federalism and Company Law: A “Race to the Bottom” in the European 
Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581, 1600 (1991) (noting that the “real seat of a company has been 
described as the company’s ‘headquarters,’ the ‘brain of the enterprise,’ or the place where the ‘final 
decisions’ are made”) (quoting 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 40–41 (2d. ed. 1958); 1 H. 
BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 232 (7th ed. 1981)).  However, in the 
corporate law literature, the “real seat rule” is typically described as a rule according to which a 
corporation’s internal affairs are governed by the law of the state where the corporation’s 
headquarters are located.  See, e.g., Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 55–56 (2005) (noting that the real seat rule “dictates that the 
internal affairs of a corporation are governed not by the law of the state of incorporation but by the 
law of the state in which the corporation’s headquarters is located”). 
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choices over twenty-five years (1994–2018).  It is important to note that the 
resulting dataset lacks information on the headquarters locations of privately-
held corporations.  Therefore, this Article focuses solely on publicly-traded 
firms.  
The analysis that this Article undertakes yields several core insights.  To 
begin, firm relocations from one U.S. state to another are by no means 
uncommon.  On average, about nine percent of all public corporations 
relocated their headquarters at least once between 1994 and 201837  The 
majority of these relocation choices are not merely a byproduct of corporate 
mergers.  Even if one excludes relocations occurring in the context of 
mergers, about five percent of all public corporations relocated at least 
once.38   
Moreover, just like the market for corporate charters, state competition 
for corporate headquarters has winners and losers.  For example, whereas for 
every one million inhabitants Massachusetts has about forty-four 
headquarters of public corporations, New Mexico has only one.39 
I also show that even if a state accounts for a substantial share of the 
market for corporate headquarters, this success does not necessarily translate 
into an equally large percentage of the market for headquarters relocations.  
Some states, such as California and New York, are home to an unusually 
large number of corporate headquarters both in absolute terms and on a per 
capita basis.40  Still, both states tend to lose out when it comes to firms’ 
headquarters relocation choices.41 
Finally, I provide some evidence that the quality of a state’s legal 
institutions appears to play a role in firms’ relocation choices.  Specifically, 
I find that the quality of state courts, as measured by a survey-based U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce ranking, is positively correlated with the (net) 
number of firms relocating their headquarters to a state.42  By contrast, I do 
not find any evidence that corporate income tax rates drive relocation 
choices.43   
Part I of this Article analyzes and dismisses potential constitutional 
obstacles to headquarters-based corporate law norms.44  Part II discusses the 
differences between charter competition and competition for firms’ 
 
 37. See infra Table 1. 
 38. See infra Table 1.  I only consider completed mergers with a deal value of at least one 
million U.S. dollars. 
 39. See infra Table 5. 
 40. See infra Tables 4 and 5. 
 41. See infra Table 9 & 10. 
 42. See infra Table 13. 
 43. See infra Table 13. 
 44. See infra Part I. 
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headquarters.45  Part III explains the data sources used for this study.46  Part 
IV provides descriptive statistics on firms’ relocation choices.47  Part V 
analyzes potential firm-level determinants of firm mobility.48  Lastly, Part VI 
focuses on state-level characteristics that may drive relocation choices.49 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
In the literature, it has been suggested that tying California’s gender 
quota to the location of a corporation’s principal executive offices violates 
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.50  According to this line of 
reasoning, the Commerce Clause requires the headquarters state to abstain 
from interfering with the internal affairs of corporations formed in other 
states.51  If this assertion were correct, it would sever any link between state 
corporate law and state competition for corporate headquarters.  However, 
the suggestion that the Commerce Clause generally requires the application 
of the internal affairs rule is unfounded.52 
 
 45. See infra Part II. 
 46. See infra Part III. 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
 48. See infra Part V. 
 49. See infra Part VI. 
 50. Teal N. Trujillo, Do We Need to Secure a Place at the Table for Women? An Analysis of 
the Legality of California Law SB-826, 45 J. LEGIS. 324, 343 (2019) (asserting that “a strong 
argument could be made under the Commerce Clause alongside a Fourteenth Amendment argument 
for why SB-826 is unconstitutional”). 
 51. See Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. P’ship, 140 A.3d 1125, 1134 (Del. 2016) (asserting that 
under both the Commerce Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Delaware corporate law 
must be applied to fiduciary claims arising in a Delaware corporation); VantagePoint Venture 
Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) (claiming that the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution mandates the application of the internal affair rule “except in the 
‘rarest situation’” (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987)); 
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 n.12 (Del. 1987) (claiming that “CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America, provides strong support for a conclusion that the commerce clause 
mandates that a state apply the internal affairs doctrine to disputes involving corporations organized 
under the laws of a sister state”).  Part of the literature also takes the view that the internal affairs 
rule is protected by the Commerce Clause.  E.g., Trujillo, infra note 50, at 343; see P. John Kozyris, 
Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate Takeovers—Controlling Choice of Law 
Through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 534 (1989) (arguing that states other than 
the state of incorporation “are in principle prevented from applying their law on a piecemeal basis 
to foreign corporations having local contacts”). 
 52. The prevailing view in the literature rightly rejects the idea that the U.S. Constitution 
requires the application of the internal affairs rule.  See, e.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened 
Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 53 
(1987) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s CTS decision only concerns antitakeover statutes 
and is not meant to enshrine the internal affairs rule as a constitutional law doctrine); Timothy P. 
Glynn, Delaware’s VantagePoint: The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 91, 118 (2008) (arguing that the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases do not support the 
claim that the internal affairs rule enjoys constitutional protection); Robert E. Suggs, Business 
Combination Antitakeover Statutes: The Unintended Repudiation of the Internal Affairs Doctrine 
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A. Edgar v. MITE Corp. 
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,53 the U.S. Supreme Court famously invalidated 
an Illinois antitakeover statute for violating the Commerce Clause.54  The 
statute imposed notification and registration requirements on tender offerors 
and authorized the Illinois Secretary of State to prevent the tender offer if its 
terms were unfair to the target shareholders.55  The statute applied if the target 
corporation had specific generously defined ties to Illinois.56  In particular, 
the fact that Illinois shareholders owned ten percent of the securities subject 
to the tender offer was sufficient to trigger the statute’s application.57  
Alternatively, the statute also applied if the target corporation met two of the 
following three conditions: (1) the target corporation’s principal office was 
located in Illinois, (2) the target corporation was incorporated in Illinois, or 
(3) Illinois accounted for at least ten percent of the target corporation’s capital 
and paid-in surplus.58   
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Commerce 
Clause both because it directly regulated interstate commerce and because its 
impact on interstate commerce would even fail the requirements for 
permissible indirect regulation of trade.59   
The Court noted that even in the absence of federal legislation, states 
were only permitted to regulate interstate commerce “incidental[ly],” while 
having to abstain from any “direct” regulation of interstate commerce.60  
According to the Court, the Illinois statute directly regulated interstate 
commerce since it purported to prevent even transactions between an out-of-
state acquirer and non-resident shareholders who lacked any connection with 
Illinois.61 
Furthermore, applying the so-called Pike test,62 the Court noted that 
even statutes that seek to protect local interests and affect interstate 
 
and Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1103 (1995) (rejecting 
the claim that CTS constitutionalized the internal affairs doctrine). 
 53. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 54. Id. at 640. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 627. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. See id. at 643 (noting that the Act is invalid because it “purports to regulate directly and to 
interdict interstate commerce” but would also be invalid as an indirect regulation of interstate trade 
under Pike v. Church). 
 60. Id. at 640 (emphasis omitted) (citing Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 
(1925)). 
 61. Id. at 642. 
 62. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  Under the Pike test, “[w]here [a]  
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
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commerce only incidentally violate the Commerce Clause if “the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”63  According to the Court, this condition was met since the 
statute had a substantial impact on shareholders in other states64 even though 
Illinois had no legitimate interest in protecting non-Illinois shareholders.65 
It is easy to distinguish the takeover statute in MITE from real or 
hypothetical state corporate law statutes that impose gender quotas based on 
a corporation’s headquarters.  To begin, statutes of the latter type do not 
prevent or regulate transactions between non-residents and hence fail to 
trigger the Supreme Court’s first Commerce Clause concern in MITE.   
Moreover, board-quota statutes of the type enacted in California do not 
fall afoul of the Pike test.  Unlike the Illinois takeover statute, board-quota 
statutes are not aimed at protecting shareholders or other stakeholders 
without ties to the state.  There are compelling reasons to think that California 
has a legitimate interest in promoting diversity at corporations that are 
headquartered in the state.66 Perhaps most importantly, a gender-quota allows 
the headquarters state to create more equal professional opportunities for its 
residents regardless of gender—the board quota gives California’s female 
residents a more meaningful chance to break the corporate glass ceiling and 
become corporate directors.67  Moreover, gender-quotas for corporate boards 
may well have positive spillover effects for gender equality for corporate 
employees outside the board,68 as well as for other areas of society.  Such 
 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”  Id. 
 63. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 
 64. Id. at 643. 
 65. Id. at 644. 
 66. Even in the corporate community, scholars perceive a growing consensus that increasing 
board diversity is an important policy objective.  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Amanda K. Packel, 
Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 377, 382 (2014) (noting a “growing consensus within the corporate community is that [board] 
diversity is an important goal” and citing survey data from the 1990s according to which “of 325 
CEOs, almost three-quarters (72%) reported that recruiting a woman director to serve on their 
company’s board was either a “top priority” or a “priority.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Catherine M.A. McCauliff & Catherine A. Savio, Gender Considerations on the 
Boards of European Union Companies: Lesson for Us Corporations or Cautionary Tale?, 16 GEO. 
J. GENDER & L. 505, 542 (2015) (noting that “[d]eep-seated societal misconceptions act as a glass 
ceiling excluding the most qualified women from the highest positions at corporations” and arguing 
that board quotas can help the glass ceiling). 
 68. For example, David A. Matsa and Amalia R. Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: 
Gender Spillovers in Corporate Leadership, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 635 (2011), examine spillover 
effects of female board members on the gender composition of corporation’s top management.  Id. 
at 635.  They find, among other things, that “lagged female board membership predicts female 
executives.”  Id. at 636.  But see Marianne Bertrand, Sandra E. Black, Sissel Jensen & Adriana 
Lleras-Muney, Breaking the Glass Ceiling? The Effect of Board Quotas on Female Labour Market 
Outcomes in Norway, 86 REV. ECON. STUD. 191, 191–239 (2019) (examining the impact of the 
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spillover effects are likely to arise primarily in the headquarters state.  In sum, 
nothing in MITE supports the argument that California’s gender quota statute 
violates the Commerce Clause. 
B. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 
In a later case, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,69 the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld an Indiana anti-takeover statute that applied only if 
the target corporation incorporated in Indiana.70  The Court first noted that 
the statute did not discriminate against interstate trade.71  It then 
acknowledged that even non-discriminatory legislation can violate the 
Commerce Clause but argued that the Indiana statute did not meet the 
relevant conditions.72  In particular, the Court held that legitimate local 
interests justified the statute.73  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the 
statute did not impose an excessive burden on interstate trade since it did not 
create the risk of inconsistent regulation.74   
The Court invoked the internal affairs doctrine both to argue that Indiana 
had a legitimate interest in imposing anti-takeover legislation governing 
Indiana corporations75 and to explain why the burden imposed on interstate 
commerce was not disproportionate.76   
Regarding the question of whether Indiana had a legitimate regulatory 
interest, the Court stressed that states have a legitimate interest in regulating 
the affairs of corporations formed under their law.77  The Court also pointed 
out that the free market for corporate shares “depends at its core upon the fact 
that a corporation—except in the rarest situations—is organized under, and 
governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law 
of the State of its incorporation.”78 
 
Norwegian board quota law enacted in 2003 and finding no evidence that this quota benefited female 
employees below the board level). 
 69. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 70. Id. at 94. 
 71. Id. at 87. 
 72. Id. at 88–94. 
 73. Id. at 93. 
 74. Id. at 88–89. 
 75. Cf. id. at 89 (arguing that “[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly 
established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to 
define the voting rights of shareholders”); id. at 93 (distinguishing the facts in MITE from those in 
CTS by pointing out that the statute at issue in CTS “applies only to corporations incorporated in 
Indiana”).  Note that while these quotes do not reference the internal affairs doctrine by name, they 
do so implicitly by assuming that “corporations incorporated in Indiana” are Indiana corporations 
and hence constitute “domestic corporations” for Indiana law. 
 76. Id. at 88–89. 
 77. Id. at 89; see also supra note 75. 
 78. Id. at 90. 
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Concerning the burden on interstate trade, the Court explained that the 
Indiana Statute failed to expose corporations to the risk of inconsistent 
regulation: 
So long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it 
has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one State.  No 
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a 
State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to 
define the voting rights of shareholders.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 304 (1971) (concluding that the law of the incorporating 
State generally should “determine the right of a shareholder to participate in 
the administration of the affairs of the corporation”).  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Indiana Act does not create an impermissible risk of 
inconsistent regulation by different States.79 
The CTS decision is sometimes adduced as evidence that the internal 
affairs doctrine enjoys constitutional status.80  For example, the Delaware 
Supreme Court cites CTS in support of the proposition that the Commerce 
Clause mandates the application of the internal affair rule “except in the 
‘rarest situations.’”81  However, CTS did not at all address conflicts between 
the state of incorporation and the real seat state.  Moreover, nothing in the 
Court’s reasoning implies that it views headquarters-state regulation of a 
corporation’s internal affairs as inherently illegal.   
Admittedly, the Court goes to great length to argue that the state of 
incorporation has a well-recognized legitimate interest in regulating a 
corporation’s internal affairs.82  However, that does not imply that the state 
of incorporation is the only state with a legitimate interest in adopting laws 
applying to a corporation’s internal affairs.  In fact, the Court itself points to 
the residence of some of the corporation’s shareholders in Indiana as an 
additional reason why Indiana has a legitimate interest in adopting takeover 
protection legislation.83 The Court thereby implies that the place of 
incorporation is not the only factor that matters.  Of course, not every 
conceivable corporate legislation adopted by the headquarters state may be 
justified by local interests.  However, as noted above, the headquarters state’s 
has a legitimate interest in creating equal professional opportunities for its 
 
 79. Id. at 89. 
 80. See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 
2005) (noting that “application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional 
principles, except in the ‘rarest situations’” (quoting McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 
(Del. 1987); CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 90)).   
 81. Id. (quoting CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 90). 
 82. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 89 (1987); see also text accompanying 
note 79. 
 83. See id. at 93 (pointing out that “every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial 
number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in protecting”). 
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female residents, and board quotas may also have a spill-over effects for the 
headquarters state’s economy and society in general.84 Therefore, board-
quota laws are very much designed to protect the headquarters state’s 
legitimate interests.85 
The question remains whether the Court’s reasoning in CTS implies that 
headquarters state laws applying to a corporation’s internal affairs 
necessarily fail the Pike test because they create the risk of inconsistent 
regulation and therefore impose an excessive burden on interstate commerce.  
However, this line of reasoning does not find any real support in the decision 
either.  In CTS, the Court stresses the lack of an excessive burden on interstate 
commerce by pointing to the fact that the application of the internal affairs 
rule prevents the risk of inconsistent regulation.86  This statement does not 
imply the inverse, however: that any law that a state other than the state of 
incorporation enacts must lead to inconsistent regulation and must, therefore, 
be disproportionate.   
Board quota legislation perfectly illustrates this point.  California’s 
board quota does not presently subject corporations to the risk of inconsistent 
regulation because nothing in the law of other states prohibits corporations 
from having female directors and thereby complying with California law.87  
Even if the state of incorporation were to enact a board quota law of its own, 
the different board quota laws do not need to be incompatible.  For example, 
the headquarters state may require thirty percent of directors to be women.  
At the same time, the state of incorporation may demand that forty percent 
of directors are women.  In this hypothetical, corporations could still comply 
with both statutes by satisfying the stricter of the two requirements.  
Admittedly, it is conceivable that some other state might, in the future, enact 
legislation that could somehow be inconsistent with California’s board-quota 
statute.  However, nothing in CTS implies that the merely theoretical risk of 
future inconsistent regulation is sufficient to make a statute 
disproportionately burdensome.88 
Finally, even if a conflict between the law of the state of incorporation 
and the law of the headquarters state arose, nothing in CTS implies that the 
 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 68–66. 
 85. See supra Section I.A. 
 86. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89 (1987) (noting that “[s]o long as each State regulates voting 
rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one 
State”); see also supra text accompanying note 79. 
 87. For example, § 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which governs corporate 
boards, contains no requirement that none of the directors can be women.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 141 (West 2020). 
 88. Cf. Paul N. Cox, The Constitutional “Dynamics” of the Internal Affairs Rule—A Comment 
on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 317, 348 (1988) (noting that “[t]here is no general constitutional 
requirement that a single state’s law be applicable predictably to a multistate commercial activity”). 
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interest of the state of incorporation would always take precedence.  
Acknowledging, as the Court does in CTS, that the state of incorporation has 
a legitimate interest in setting the rules governing the internal affairs of its 
corporation does not entail that that legitimate interest will always take 
precedence. 
In sum, the argument that the Commerce Clause prohibits headquarters 
states from regulating the internal affairs of corporations must be rejected.  
Such statutes are lawful as long as they regulate interstate commerce only 
incidentally, and, like California’s gender quota statute, protect legitimate 
local interests without imposing an excessive burden on interstate commerce.  
II.  TIEBOUT COMPETITION V. CHARTER COMPETITION 
Traditional charter competition is typically viewed as a market for 
corporate law in which corporations select a particular legal product, namely 
a state’s corporate law and courts,89 and pay the corresponding price in the 
form of franchise taxes.90  A crucial feature of this type of law market is that 
firms can select their corporate law unbundled from most other services 
provided by a state except for the state’s corporate law courts and corporate 
bar.91  
For example, a manufacturing business incorporated in Delaware but 
headquartered elsewhere does not have to pay income taxes in Delaware.92  
It does not use Delaware’s physical infrastructure when producing or 
shipping goods, and it does not rely on the protection of Delaware’s police 
or fire department.  Instead, firms that incorporate in Delaware receive a 
relatively narrow set of services—mostly Delaware’s law and judicial 
services—and pay the price in the form of franchise taxes that can be viewed 
as consideration for these services. 
By contrast, “Tiebout competition,” named in honor of Charles Tiebout 
and his classic article A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,93 has a different 
meaning.  Tiebout models competition between jurisdictions but focused on 
a scenario in which local governments provide bundles of public goods, paid 
 
 89. See Romano, Product, supra note 13, at 277 (noting that Delaware’s “product” consists of 
both corporate law and courts). 
 90. Id. at 236. 
 91. Cf. Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX 
LITIG. 51, 53–54 (2012) (noting that “Delaware markets its corporate law as a bundle of substantive 
provisions and expert decisionmakers”).  But see Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate 
Choice of Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 60 (2005) [hereinafter Dammann, New Approach] 
(noting that incorporation in a particular state such as Delaware comes with certain “side effects” 
such as exposure to litigation to third-party suits in that state). 
 92. Dammann, New Approach, supra note 91, at 71. 
 93. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
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for by residents’ taxes.94  His model assumes that citizens (“consumer-
voter[s]”) will choose the community with the bundle that best meets their 
preferences.95  Furthermore, he assumes that the costs of producing public 
goods depends on the number of consumers so that “[f]or every pattern of 
community services . . . there is an optimal community size” and that “[t]his 
optimum is defined in terms of the number of residents for which this bundle 
of services can be produced at the lowest average cost.”96  In this model, if a 
community has a number of residents below the optimal size, it will make 
efforts to attract new residents.97 Thus, a critical difference between charter 
competition and Tiebout competition is that in Tiebout’s model, jurisdictions 
do not offer narrowly defined and individually priced products but 
comprehensive bundles of public goods.98   
To the extent that states compete for corporate headquarters rather than 
corporate charters, their competition is analogous to Tiebout competition in 
the sense that a firm relocating its headquarters opts into a comprehensive 
bundle of public goods produced by the headquarters state.99  These goods 
include, for example, the state’s physical infrastructure, its institutions, and 
all types of services rendered by the state.  In return, the corporation has to 
pay corporate income taxes, sales taxes, and various other kinds of fees and 
taxes. 
Crucially, competition for corporate headquarters creates different 
incentives for states than charter competition does.  On the one hand, states 
have more substantial incentives to compete.  On the other hand, they now 
compete across a whole range of services, and thus corporate law may not 
play a crucial role in that competition.  I will address these points in turn.  
A.  States’ Incentives to Compete 
For most states, the incentives to compete for corporate headquarters are 
much more pronounced than the incentives to compete for corporate charters.  
As Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar have shown, most states have minimal 
financial reasons to compete for corporate charters.100  Delaware is an 
exception in this regard.  In particular, given the relatively small total size of 
its state budget, revenues from the charter business account for a substantial 
 
 94. See id. at 418–19 (explaining that communities use tax revenues to produce community 
services and referring to a particular combination of services as a “bundle” or “pattern”). 
 95. Id. at 418. 
 96. Id. at 419. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 418 (pointing out that communities provide such services as “police and fire 
protection, education, hospitals, and courts”). 
 99. Cf. Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1750 n.130 
(2006) (analogizing competition for investments to Tiebout competition). 
 100. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 18, at 748–49. 
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stage of Delaware’s overall revenues.101  Most other states impose very low 
franchise fees, and the revenues that most states derive from charter 
competition are minuscule compared to their total revenues.  Thus, for most 
states, losing corporate charters to Delaware does not constitute a significant 
financial concern.   
By contrast, no state can ignore the competition for corporate 
headquarters.  Corporate headquarters bring jobs.  Moreover, they produce 
income tax revenues from both the corporation and its employees and benefit 
local property values.102  States are very much aware of the importance of 
competing for firms’ headquarters.  It is common practice for states to woo 
large corporations with subsidies or other benefits.103  For example, when 
Amazon announced its intention to establish a second headquarters, many 
states went to substantial lengths to be chosen.104  New Jersey alone offered 
tax incentives worth seven billion dollars to lure Amazon to New Jersey,105 
and that was not even enough to succeed. 
B. The Role of Corporate Law 
While states have more substantial incentives to compete for corporate 
headquarters than for corporate charters, corporate law may not play a 
decisive role in their efforts to compete.  One of the key features of state 
competition for corporate headquarters lies in the fact that states compete by 
offering bundles of public goods.106  Corporate law may be of relatively 
minor importance to states’ efforts to attract firms.  Hence, it remains unclear 
to what extent competition for corporate headquarters can motivate states to 
offer attractive corporate law.   
 
 101. See infra text accompanying note 132. 
 102. See, e.g., Peter D. Myers & Tracy M. Turner, The House Price Impacts of Corporate 
Headquarter Relocations 26 (May 2017) (Honors thesis, Iowa State University), 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=honors_posters (finding that 
both the arrival and the departure of a corporate headquarters correlates with higher house prices). 
 103. Ben Casselman, Risks for Cities in Sweetening Amazon’s Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2018, 
at A1 (describing tax incentive packages offered by various states to attract major companies’ 
headquarters). 
 104. See, e.g., Mitch Smith, Tiffany Hsu, Kirk Johnson & Particia Mazzei, Where Amazon May 
Build Its Second Headquarters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2018, at B6 (noting that Amazon had received 
238 applications from different regions); Ben Casselman, Promising Billions to Amazon: Is It a 
Good Deal for Cities?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/economy/amazon-finalists-incentives.html 
(describing offers that different states made to Amazon). 
 105. Id. (noting that “New Jersey announced a $7 billion package of tax incentives to try to lure 
Amazon’s second headquarters to Newark”). 
 106. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
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III.  DATA 
To gain a better understanding of state competitions for corporate 
headquarters, I created a dataset on interstate headquarters-relocations 
spanning twenty-five years (1994–2018).  Data on the primary place of 
business are obtained from a dataset of firms’ SEC filings.107  To obtain SEC 
filings, I primarily rely on a dataset made available by Notre Dame’s 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance108 but complement this 
dataset with data from SEC Analytics.109 
Furthermore, I include firm-level financial data from CRSP Compustat 
Merged (“CMM”) and data on mergers from SDC Platinum.110  To assess the 
quality of a state’s court system, I rely on ratings published by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform.111  For any given year, 
a court’s rank is determined by the most recent U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Survey undertaken before that year.  Data on corporate income tax rates are 
obtained from the Tax Policy Center.112   
IV.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics on state competition for corporate headquarters are 
displayed in Tables 1 to 10.  These statistics yield several essential insights 
 
 107. I retain only firms headquartered in the United States.  To the extent that filing information 
is missing for some years but not for others, I extend the information about the headquarters state 
backwards from the most recent filing.  To reduce the risk of erroneous data, particularly as a result 
of firms making incorrect filings, I drop firms that are shown to have relocated their headquarters 
five or more times between 1994 and 2018.  A manual inspection of some of the relevant firms’ 
filings suggests that these are firms that mistakenly fill in the address of their registered agent in the 
fields reserved for their business address on some forms and thus falsely appear to move back and 
forth between their actual headquarters state and what really is their state of incorporation.  I rely 
on information from SEC Analytics solely to add information for firms for which data is missing in 
the Notre Dame dataset.  As between different filings made by the same firm in the same year, I use 
the following hierarchy, from high to low: 10-K/A, 10-K, 10-Q/A, 10-Q, 8-K/A, 8-K, all other types 
of filings.  Filings that rank lower in this hierarchy than a filing that indicates the headquarters state 
and was made by the same firm in the same year are dropped. 
 108. Augmented 10-X Header Data, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, 
https://sraf.nd.edu/data/augmented-10-x-header-data/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
 109. SEC Analytics is available via the WHARTON RSCH. DATA SERVS. (WRDS), https://wrds-
www.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).   
 110. For SDC Platinum see REFINITIV, https://www.refinitiv.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).  
For CMM see CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, CTR. FOR RSCH. IN SEC. PRICES (CRSP), 
http://www.crsp.org/products/research-products/crspcompustat-merged-database (last visited Nov. 
22, 2020).  I access both datasets via the WHARTON RSCH. DATA SERVS. (WRDS), https://wrds-
www.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
 111. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform has published several so-called 
“Lawsuit Climate Survey[s].”  Institute for Legal Reform, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (on file with 
Maryland Law Review). 
 112. State Corporate Income Tax Rates 2002 to 2020, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-corporate-income-tax-rates. 
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regarding the frequency with which firms relocate their headquarters, the 
financial and industry characteristics associated with corporations’ mobility, 
and the success that states have in attracting or retaining corporate 
headquarters. 
A. How Often Do Firms Relocate Their Headquarters? 
One of the critical questions concerning state competition for corporate 
headquarters concerns how often public corporations move their 
headquarters.  If very few firms ever change the location of their headquarters 
from one state to another, then states may have little reason to compete for 
relocating corporations.  Furthermore, in that case, there is no need to be 
concerned that firms will evade real-seat-based corporate law by moving 
their headquarters elsewhere.  By contrast, if relatively many firms are 
willing to relocate, then state competition is much more likely to be vigorous 
since states have more to lose by failing to compete. 
Table 1, which displays summary statistics for both mobile and 
immobile firms, demonstrates that the percentage of mobile firms is quite 
substantial.  Over twenty-five years (1994–2018), roughly nine percent of 
public corporations relocated their headquarters at least once (Table 1 Panel 
A).   
Of course, a firm’s decision to move its headquarters may simply be the 
byproduct of a merger.  If two firms with headquarters in different states 
merge, the surviving corporation must decide which of the two headquarters 
to retain.  As a result, the surviving corporation may change the location of 
its headquarters, even though the “new” headquarters is nothing but the “old” 
headquarters of one of the merging corporations.  To account for this 
possibility, Table 1 Panel B defines relocating firms more narrowly by 
excluding firms that relocated within one year before or after a completed 
merger.113  Applying this narrower definition, the percentage of firms that 
relocated at least once drops to about five percent (Table 1 Panel B).  
Nonetheless, this percentage is substantial. 
Whether or not it makes sense to exclude relocations that occur in the 
context of mergers depends on the context.  On the one hand, excluding such 
relocations is helpful if one seeks to compare the characteristics of relocating 
and non-relocating firms.114  By excluding relocations that occur in the 
contexts of mergers, one avoids picking up differences in characteristics that 
are driven by differences between merging and non-merging firms.  One the 
other hand, if one seeks to explore states’ incentives to compete for corporate 
headquarters, there is no reason to exclude firms that relocate their 
 
 113. I only consider mergers with a deal value of at least one million dollars. 
 114. See infra Section IV.B. 
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headquarters in the context of corporate mergers.  After all, merger-related 
relocations are no less relevant to a state’s economy than other relocations.  
That is, the fact that a firm relocates in the context of a merger does not 
change the fact that the state losing the corporate headquarters may face job 
losses and a decline in tax revenues. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Table 1, like all other Tables 
included in this Article, captures only those headquarters relocations, in 
which a corporation moves its headquarters from one U.S. state to another.  
In other words, Table 1 excludes all cases in which a corporation relocates 
its headquarters within the same state.  Because this Article focuses on state 
competition for corporate charters, headquarters relocations within a state 
(“intrastate relocations”) are of no interest. 
B. The Characteristics of Mobile Firms 
Table 1 allows for some basic comparisons between mobile and 
immobile firms.  As shown in Panels A and B, firms that relocated (cols. 3-
4) and firms that failed to relocate (cols. 1-2) differed with respect to all of 
the financial variables displayed.  Moreover, in most cases, that difference is 
statistically significant at the five percent or even one percent level.  For 
example, relocating firms are smaller in terms of their total assets, which is 
intuitive in that larger firms may face much higher transaction costs when 
relocating.  Mobile firms are also less profitable and have higher leverage.   
One must keep in mind, though, that the figures in Table 1 do not answer 
the question of whether these differences developed before or after the 
relocation, let alone whether they contributed to the decision to relocate.  For 
this reason, Part V of this Article revisits the firm-level determinants of 
relocation choices using a more sophisticated econometric approach. 
Tables 2 and 3 contain data on relocations by industry.  In absolute 
terms, most firms that relocated at least once between 1994 and 2018 can be 
found in manufacturing, finance, insurance, and real estate (Table 3).  
However, once one divides the number of mobile firms by the total number 
of  firms in the relevant industry, the picture changes (Table 3).  Only firms 
in the finance, insurance, and real estate categories stand out as having an 
unusually high level of mobility, and only for the years after 2000.  Excluding 
relocations that occurred in the context of mergers does not substantially 
change this picture (Table 3 cols. 2, 3 & 6).115 
 
 115. Note that Table 3 should not be used to compare mobility rates for the same category of 
firms across time periods.  The time periods displayed in Table 3 have different lengths since firm 
location data are not (yet) available for years before 1994 or after 2018. 
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C. Which States Win and Which States Lose? 
One of the undisputed facts in the literature on regulatory competition 
is that Delaware is the winner in the market for corporate charters.116  More 
than half of all public corporations are incorporated in Delaware.117  Among 
Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) firms, Delaware’s market share is even 
higher.118  Before addressing the question of how states fare in the market for 
corporate headquarters, it is worth focusing on the reasons for Delaware’s 
dominance. 
D. The Charter Market 
The fact that a single state, Delaware, dominates the charter market is 
not particularly surprising.  Corporate law is a non-rivalrous good in the 
economic sense, meaning that one person’s use of it does not prevent another 
person from using it simultaneously.119  After all, the fact that Delaware law 
governs one corporation’s internal affairs does not prevent it from also 
applying to other corporations.  As a result, Delaware can allow the number 
of corporations incorporated in Delaware to increase, without lowering the 
quality of the law it supplies. 
Whereas Delaware’s corporate law is non-rivalrous, the same does not 
hold for Delaware’s corporate law courts—the Chancery Court and the 
 
 116. See, e.g., Kamar, Indeterminacy, supra note 20, at 1908 (noting that “Delaware dominates 
the [charter] market”); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the 
Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward A Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 265, 277 (1990) (noting that “Delaware, has consistently led the field for the past fifty years”).  
Numerous other authors have pointed out that Delaware dominates the charter market.  E.g., 
Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantagepoint: The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 97 (2008); Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 2101, 2166 (2018); Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global 
Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008); Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
465, 472 (2015). 
 117. E.g., Trevor S. Norwitz, Accountability Does Not Require Constant Vulnerability: A Simple 
but Necessary Update to the Delaware General Corporation Law, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 105, 105 
(2016); cf. Why Businesses Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-
businesses-choose-delaware/ (last visited May 14, 2020) (noting that “more than 60 percent of the 
Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware”). 
 118. Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held 
Corporations, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 87 (2011) (finding that in 2006 and 2007, eighty-eight 
percent of all corporations going public were incorporated in Delaware); Robert Daines, The 
Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1571–72 (2002) (examining sample 
of IPOs between 1978 and 2000 and finding that about fifty-six percent were incorporated in 
Delaware). 
 119. That is the generally accepted definition of non-rivalrous.  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1605 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 
147, 184 (1998). 
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Delaware Supreme Court—which also constitute an essential part of 
Delaware’s product.120  In theory, an increasing number of corporations 
choosing to incorporate in Delaware may translate into overburdened judges 
and delayed legal proceedings.  However, Delaware has found a way to avoid 
this problem.  Most of Delaware’s corporate law cases are litigated in 
Delaware’s Chancery Court,121 which has allowed Delaware to keep pace 
with a growing caseload by increasing the number of Chancery Court judges.  
Under Delaware’s 1792 Constitution, the Chancery Court only had one 
Chancellor and no Vice-Chancellors.122  That did not immediately change 
with Delaware’s 1897 Constitution.123  However, in 1939, Delaware added 
the first Vice-Chancellor, thereby doubling the total number of Chancery 
Court judges.124  A second Vice-Chancellor was added in 1961,125 a third in 
1984,126 a fourth in 1989,127 and a fifth and sixth in 2018.128  In other words, 
Delaware has increased the number of corporate law judges sixfold since 
1938, thereby preventing its judiciary from becoming an obstacle to 
Delaware’s success in the charter market.  
There are other reasons for why a single state dominates the charter 
market.  Corporate law scholars have adduced various explanations for 
Delaware’s success, and the relevant narratives also help to explain, either 
implicitly or explicitly, why such a large fraction of public corporations are 
incorporated in a single state. 
Roberta Romano has famously advanced the so-called “hostage theory” 
of Delaware’s success.129  According to Romano, Delaware has created 
highly valuable assets related to the charter market, such as a judicial 
infrastructure and a comprehensive set of corporate law precedents.130  These 
 
 120. It is generally recognized that Delaware’s excellent courts play an important role in 
attracting corporate charters.  See, e.g., Romano, Product, supra note 13, at 280; Bernard S. 
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589–
90 (1990); Kamar, Indeterminancy, supra note 20, at 1925–26; Glynn, supra note 116, at 100–01; 
LoPucki, supra note 116, at 2166. 
 121. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 903 (1990) (noting that corporate law cases account for about three-fourths 
of the workload of the Delaware Chancery Court). 
 122. Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 675, 680 n.42 (2009). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.; see also William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery—1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 846 (1993). 
 125. Id. at 851–52. 
 126. Id. at 858. 
 127. Id. at 860. 
 128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 307 (West 2020) (increasing the number of vice-chancellors 
from four to six), amended by 81 Del. Laws ch. 288, § 1 (2018). 
 129. Romano, Product, supra note 13, at 235, 240–41. 
 130. Id. at 277. 
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assets would lose much of their value if Delaware lost its lead in the charter 
market.131  Moreover, Delaware is heavily dependent on revenues from 
franchise taxes, which account for a disproportionate share of Delaware’s 
budget: more than twenty-seven percent as of 2020.132  As a result, Delaware 
can send a credible signal to its corporate customers that it will remain 
committed to protecting their interests.133  Differently put, Delaware can 
provide its corporate customers with a hostage in the form of its investments 
in the charter market, and that hostage serves as a commitment device to 
guarantee Delaware’s favorable treatment of corporations in the future.134  
Crucially, this theory explains the dominance of a single state.  Once a state 
has attracted a majority of public corporations, that state has more to lose 
than any competing state, making it more difficult for competing states to 
signal their commitment in an equally credible way. 
Michael Klausner has contributed another piece of the puzzle by arguing 
that choosing Delaware as their state of incorporation allows corporations to 
reap significant network benefits given the number of other large 
corporations incorporated in that state.135  This “network theory” not only 
explains Delaware’s success but also points to why any state, once it has 
achieved dominance in the charter market, may be difficult to dethrone:  By 
definition, new entrants cannot offer comparable network benefits.136   
Scholars including Romano have also pointed to other benefits that 
Delaware offers, such as superb corporate law courts137 and a well-developed 
 
 131. Id. at 235. 
 132. Governor’s Budget Financial Summary and Charts, DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2020/documents/operating/financial-summary.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2020) (putting estimated revenues from incorporation revenues at 27.6 percent of 
the all revenues for the fiscal year 2020). 
 133. Romano, Product, supra note 13, at 276–77.  This theory has gained widespread support in 
the literature as one of the factors explaining Delaware’s success in the charter market.  E.g., Kamar, 
Indeterminancy, supra note 20, at 1927. 
 134. Romano, Product, supra note 13, at 276–77. 
 135. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 841–47 (1995).  Network benefits are now widely recognized to constitute one of the 
reasons for Delaware’s success in the charter market.  E.g., Kamar, Indeterminancy, supra note 116, 
at 1923–24; Brummer, supra note 116, at 1070. 
 136. It has long been recognized that network effects are a potential to market entry.  E.g., Mark 
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
479, 503–04 (1998); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 586 (2002). 
 137. Romano, Product, supra note 13, at 280; Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A 
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 590 (1990); Kamar, Indeterminancy, 
supra note 20, at 1925; Glynn, supra note 116, at 100–01; LoPucki, supra note 116, at 2166; Jill E. 
Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000). 
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body of case law,138 as factors that favor the rise of a single leading corporate 
law jurisdiction.  As long as a disproportionate number of corporate law cases 
are litigated in Delaware, judges in other states will find it challenging to 
achieve the level of expertise and experience that Delaware judges enjoy.  
Nor can other states hope to create a set of precedents similar to that of 
Delaware as long as Delaware attracts a disproportionate share of corporate 
law cases.  Admittedly, some years ago, John Armour and his coauthors 
found that Delaware’s share of large corporate cases was declining, as 
shareholders of Delaware corporations increasingly brought lawsuits in 
federal or state courts outside of Delaware.139  However, since 2014, 
Delaware law has allowed corporations to adopt so-called exclusive-forum 
bylaws, thereby forcing shareholder plaintiffs to litigate claims based on 
Delaware corporate law in Delaware courts.140 
Finally, Ehud Kamar has argued that Delaware can increase its 
advantages vis-à-vis other states by rendering its law indeterminate.141  For 
example, he points out that indeterminate law increases the importance of 
precedents, makes it more challenging to copy Delaware law and also 
increases the value of Delaware’s expert judiciary.142  While this theory 
remains controversial,143 it provides yet another potential explanation of why 
the state dominating the charter market may find it possible to defend its lead.  
As Kamar points out, copying the leading state’s statutory law or case law 
may not offer an easy way for other states to compete.144 
 
 138. Glynn, supra note 116, at 100; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1511 (1989); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the 
Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 638–39 (2004). 
 139. John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 610 (2012). 
 140. The Delaware Chancery Court first recognized the legality of exclusive-forum bylaws in 
2014.  Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013).  The 
Delaware legislature subsequently codified corporations’ right to adopt exclusive-forum bylaws.  
See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 115 (West 2020) (allowing corporations to adopt exclusive-forum bylaws) 
(added by 80 Del. Laws ch. 40, § 5 (2015)). 
 141. Kamar, Indeterminacy, supra note 20, at 1911. 
 142. E.g., id. 
 143. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES 
REGULATION 87 (2002) (arguing that Delaware law offers a fairly high degree of predictability and 
that corporations incorporate in Delaware partly for that reason); Jens C. Dammann, Indeterminacy 
in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 54, 58 (2013) 
(questioning any link between regulatory competition and indeterminacy by pointing out that U.K. 
and German corporate law is at least as indeterminate as Delaware corporate law despite the fact 
that regulatory competition in corporate law was traditionally absent in Europe). 
 144. Kamar, Indeterminacy, supra note 20, at 1911.  In fact, it is noteworthy that two states, 
Kansas and Oklahoma, have copied Delaware’s statutory law.  See William J. Carney & George B. 
Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 57 n.304 
(2009); Dammann, supra note 143, at 60 n.25.  Yet neither Kansas nor Oklahoma have been 
particularly successful in attracting corporate charters.  See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose & Larry J. 
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E. The Market for Corporate Headquarters 
Whereas the market for corporate charters may naturally tend to have a 
single dominant jurisdiction, the circumstances in the market for corporate 
headquarters are very different.   
On the one hand, some of the considerations that favor the emergence 
of a dominant jurisdiction in the market for corporate charters also apply to 
state competition for corporate headquarters.  For example, some goods that 
states provide to corporations headquartered there, such as the law governing 
relations with third parties, are also non-rivalrous.145  Moreover, just as 
corporations choosing their state of incorporation may care about network 
effects, corporations selecting a location for their headquarters may be 
interested in finding a place that offers a cluster of similar establishments.  
That way, the firm can benefit from a highly trained workforce, a public 
administration that understands the industry, and experienced service 
providers. 
However, unlike states competing for corporate charters, states and 
municipalities competing for corporate headquarters may face capacity 
problems.  As the number of locally headquartered firms increases, so may 
the side effects that go hand in hand with such growth.  The state’s physical 
infrastructure may become overburdened, wages in the local labor markets 
may rise in response to increasing demand, and skyrocketing housing prices 
may lead to higher living expenses which further contribute to the rise of 
labor costs.146   
In other words, unlike in the market for corporate charters, states 
competing for corporate headquarters may not be able to keep expanding 
their market share without becoming less attractive to some of the firms 
already headquartered there.  This may prevent any single jurisdiction from 
dominating the market for corporate headquarters.  Moreover, it is 
conceivable that state competition for corporate headquarters may result in a 
sorting effect.  As a state attracts more and more headquarters, some 
corporations may find the state more attractive, since they benefit from the 
advantages that a cluster of businesses has to offer.  In contrast, other 
 
LeBlanc, Policing Public Companies: An Empirical Examination of the Enforcement Landscape 
and the Role Played by State Securities Regulators, 65 FLA. L. REV. 395, 427 tbl.A.1 (2013) 
(displaying the percentage of public corporations incorporated in each state and showing that 
Delaware’s share is 58.7 percent, whereas Oklahoma’s and Kansas each account of 0.3 percent). 
 145. E.g., Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO’s Two Step Test for Environmental Measures Under 
Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 117, 124 n.26 (2007) (noting that the consumption 
of legislation is non-rivalrous). 
 146. See, e.g., Nour Malas & Paul Overberg, San Francisco Has a People Problem, WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/san-francisco-has-a-people-problem-1521691260 
(explaining San Francisco’s economic boom has led to high housing prices). 
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corporations may prefer to leave because they are interested in factors, such 
as low labor costs, that the state can no longer offer. 
F. Empirical Findings 
Tables 4 to 6 display data on the migration of firms by state, and 
demonstrate that the market for corporate headquarters has unfolded quite 
differently from the charter market.  There are many different ways to 
measure the market shares of individual states. 
Table 4 displays the absolute number of headquarters by state and year.  
In 2018, California was home to the highest number of corporate 
headquarters (675), Vermont and Wyoming to the lowest (two each).  Note 
that the total number of public corporations in the United States has dropped 
sharply following the financial crisis that started in 2008 so that most states 
were home to substantially fewer corporations in 2018 than in 2005.   
Of course, the fact that many corporations are headquartered in large 
and populous states such as California, New York (515), and Texas (409), is 
not particularly surprising.  A more useful indicator may be the number of 
corporate headquarters that each state hosts on a per capita basis (Table 5).  
On this dimension, Delaware, Massachusetts, and New York are leading the 
field, with sixty, forty-four, and twenty-three headquarters for every one 
million inhabitants, whereas New Mexico finds itself in the last place, with 
one.147 
Of course, not all public corporations are created equal; in particular, 
some public corporations are much larger than others.  Therefore, Table 6 
focuses on the total market capitalization of corporations headquartered in 
each state.  California wins this race with a total market capitalization of 
almost seven trillion dollars, with New York (3.6 trillion dollars) and Texas 
(2.1 trillion dollars) taking distant second and third places.  Table 7 also 
focuses on market capitalization but in per capita amounts.  On that 
dimension, Nebraska, Washington, and New York take the first, second, and 
third places, respectively. 
G.  Which States Win and Lose in the Market for Relocations 
Tables 8 to 10 display information on firms’ interstate relocation 
choices.   
Table 8 focuses on the net number of headquarters that states have 
gained or lost as a result of relocations.  The net gain or loss is defined as the 
 
 147. The numbers for Delaware should, perhaps, be read with some caution.  Because the SEC 
has not yet formally defined the meaning of “principal executive office,” see the analysis supra note 
35, it is at least conceivable that some firms indicated the address of their Delaware office, rather 
than that of their headquarters, in their SEC filings. 
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number of headquarters that have relocated to the state from other states 
minus the number of headquarters that have relocated from the state to other 
states.  On this measure, Texas has consistently done very well, whereas 
states like California, Massachusetts, and New York have typically done 
quite poorly. 
Table 9 takes the same approach, except that it calculates states net gains 
and losses on a per capita basis.  As a result, the picture becomes more varied, 
though it is noteworthy that Massachusetts still tends to fare poorly, whereas 
Texas still manages to do quite well. 
H. Sorting 
One of the crucial characteristics of state competition for corporate 
headquarters is that states are competing on multiple dimensions.  Moreover, 
because many of the goods that they are offering are rivalrous, the 
attractiveness of a state’s business environment may change over time in a 
way that impacts different corporations differently.  For example, continued 
success in attracting businesses may lead to higher wages in the local labor 
market as well as to higher property prices, which may be highly 
disadvantageous for corporations that rely on cheap labor.   
Therefore, one would expect a continuous sorting process, in which 
states experience a combination of arrivals and departures reflecting differing 
preferences on the part of corporations.148  Table 10, which displays 
information on the number of corporations moving their headquarters in and 
out of states, is consistent with this hypothesis.  Typically states experience 
moves in both directions.  For example, in the years 2010 to 2018, California 
lost fifty-seven headquarters to other states, but also gained forty-eight 
headquarters. 
V.  FIRM-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF RELOCATIONS 
The summary statistics displayed in Table 1 suggest that not all firms 
are equally likely to relocate.  Instead, some firm characteristics may make it 
more likely that a firm will move its corporate headquarters from one state to 
another.  In this Part, therefore, I will analyze the impact of firm-level 
variables on firms’ relocation choices.  
A. Hypotheses 
Given that large firms may face higher transaction costs when relocating 
their headquarters from one state to another, I hypothesize that such firms are 
 
 148. C.f. Tiebout, supra note 93, at 421–23 (predicting that residents will move from one 
community to another as the bundle of goods offered by communities changes). 
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less likely to relocate.  To capture firm size, I focus on total assets, number 
of employees, and assets in the form of property, plant, and equipment, as 
defined in Table A.1. 
The literature on headquarters relocations across international borders 
has found that taxes play a role in firms’ choices about where to locate or 
relocate their headquarters.149  I therefore hypothesize that a firm’s effective 
tax rate, as defined in Table A.1, is positively correlated with firms’ decision 
to relocate. 
B. Model 
To explore the role of firm size and effective tax rates in firms’ 
relocation choices, I rely on a probit model.  The underlying function, which 
determines if a firm relocates its headquarters in a particular year, is given by 
equation (1): 
 
(1)		𝑌!,#∗ = 𝛽% + 𝛽&)𝑋!,#'&+ + 𝜀!,# 
The variable 𝑌!,#∗  is unobserved.  However, the observed outcome, that 






Note that i indexes firms, whereas t indexes years.  The term 𝑋!,#%& 
captures various firm level characteristics including the firms’ effective tax 
rate and various variables capturing firm size, such as the natural of the 
number of a firm’s employees and the natural log of a firm’s total assets.  The 
desired probability is then given by the following equation: 
 
(3)		Prob	)𝑌!,#∗ = 1	=	𝑋!,#'&) = Ф?
	𝛽% + 𝛽&𝑋!,#'&
σ A	 
As a robustness check, I also use a fixed effects logit model.  For the 




 149. See, e.g., Egger et al., supra note 23, at 632 (finding that high labor taxes in the shape of 
labor income taxes and employers’ Social Security contributions are associated with a lower 
probability that a country is selected for a corporate headquarters); Laamanen et al., supra note 23, 
at 202 (finding that increases in taxation will make it more likely that firms leave a country and also 
reduce the chance that a country will be selected as a location for corporate headquarters). 
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(4)		𝑌!,#∗ = 𝛽% + 𝛽&)𝑋!,#'&+ + 𝛼! + 𝜀!,# 
Note that equation (4) differs from equation (1) only in that the right-
hand side of equation (4) includes an additional term 𝛼! 	which captures firm 
fixed effects.  The probability function for the logit model is given by 
equation (5):  
 





The results for the probit model are displayed in Table 11, and those for 
the fixed-effects logit model in Table 12. 
 As hypothesized, there is some evidence that larger firms, as measured 
in terms of total assets and number of employees are less likely to relocate.  
The relevant coefficients are negative and statistically significant in several 
specifications.   
By contrast, I find no evidence that firms with higher effective tax rates 
are more likely to relocate.  This result does not prove that tax considerations 
fail to play a role in relocation choices.  However, this finding raises doubts 
about whether a high tax burden is necessarily a primary factor determining 
whether corporations relocate or stay put. 
VI. STATE CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM RELOCATIONS 
This Article focuses on state competition for corporate headquarters.  
Against this background, a central question concerns to what extent states’ 
legal systems may be driving corporations’ relocation choices.  
A. Background and Hypotheses 
Assessing the impact of corporate law on relocation choices is not yet 
an option since until recently the location of a corporation’s headquarters did 
not affect the corporate law governing the internal affairs of public 
corporations.  Therefore, this Article focuses on two other features of states’ 
legal systems: state corporate income tax rates and the quality of state court 
systems.   
In the international context, various studies have found that the 
determinants of firms’ decisions about where to locate their headquarters 
include differences in taxation.150  Accordingly, I hypothesize that corporate 
 
 150. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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income tax rates in the (old) headquarters state correlate positively with 
firms’ decision to relocate their headquarters.   
Furthermore, various studies have shown that firms’ incorporation 
choices are driven in part by the court quality.151  In particular, a well-
developed body of literature stresses the importance of high-quality courts 
for economic development.152  Therefore, I hypothesize that corporations 
headquartered in states with high-quality courts are less likely to relocate 
their headquarters elsewhere. 
B. Results 
To explore the relevance of state-level differences in court quality and 
corporate income tax rate, I use a linear regression with fixed effects in which 
the dependent variable is the net number of relocations to a state in a given 
year, meaning the number of headquarters relocations to the state in a given 
year minus the number of relocations from that state to other states in that 
year.  In other words:  
 
(3)𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠',# =	𝛽( +	𝛽&𝑋',# + 𝜇' + 𝜀',# 
 
 In this model, s indexes headquarters states and t indexes years.  Note 
that the term 𝑋',# captures state characteristics that vary over time, whereas 
𝜇' captures state fixed effects. 
The results are displayed in Tables 13.  I find no statistically significant 
evidence that state level corporate income tax rates contribute to states’ 
success in retaining corporations (Table 13 cols. 4–6).  This is consistent with 
the finding reported in Tables 10 and 11 that corporations’ effective tax rate 
does not appear to be correlated with firms’ decision to relocate. 
 
 151. See, e.g., Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately 
Held Corporations, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 106–07 (2011) (finding that large privately held 
corporations are more likely to incorporate outside of their headquarters state if the quality of the 
headquarters state’s courts is poor); Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory 
Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 357 (2006) 
(finding that public corporations from states with better courts are more likely to incorporate 
locally).  But see Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies 
Formed? An Empirical Analysis, 55 J.L. & ECON. 741, 768 (2012) (finding no evidence that court 
quality, as measured by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Ranking, matters to where limited liability 
companies are formed). 
 152. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 54 (1990) (pointing to the lack of good contract enforcement mechanisms as a 
central obstacle to development in the third world); Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, 
Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (stressing the central role of 
good courts to economic development).  For a summary of the empirical literature, see generally 
Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic 
Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2006). 
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By contrast, there is some evidence that high-quality courts contribute 
to states’ success in retaining corporations.  The court quality coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the five percent level (Table 13 cols. 
1–3).   
V. CONCLUSION 
California’s 2018 statute introducing a gender quota for corporate 
boards is remarkable for many reasons.153  One of them is that the statute 
applies to all publicly traded corporations that have their principal place of 
business in California, regardless of where they are incorporated.   
Statutes that tie the application of corporate law to the location of a 
firm’s headquarters create a new dimension in which state competition can 
impact corporate law.  In addition to traditional charter competition, 
competition for corporate headquarters may now begin to shape state 
corporate laws.  For example, states may shy away from enacting 
headquarters-based gender quotas for fear of causing corporations to relocate.   
To gain a better empirical understanding of state competition for 
corporate headquarters, this Article examines a dataset covering corporate 
relocations of publicly traded firms in the years 1994 to 2018.  My analysis 
yields several valuable insights.  
First, corporate relocations are by no means uncommon.  Even if one 
excludes relocations that occurred in the context of a merger, roughly five 
percent of publicly traded firms relocated their headquarters at least once 
between 1994 and 2018. 
Second, much like the market for corporate charters, the market for 
corporate headquarters has winners and losers.  However, which states win 
and which states lose depends, to a large extent, on how one defines success 
in the market for corporate headquarters.  Different possible criteria include 
the absolute or per capita number of headquarters located in each state and 
the absolute or per capita market capitalization of corporations headquartered 
in each state.  States that boast an unusually large number of corporate 
headquarters may not be particularly successful in the market for corporate 
relocations.  For example, while Massachusetts is home to a large number of 
corporate headquarters, more corporations tend to relocate from 
Massachusetts to other states than the other way around.  By contrast, Texas 
is one state that has consistently been quite successful at attracting and 
retaining corporate headquarters. 
Third, I find no evidence that high taxes are a push factor causing 
corporations to relocate elsewhere.  I find no statistically significant evidence 
 
 153. See supra note 1. 
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that state-level state corporate income tax rates or firm-level effective rates 
of taxation explain firms’ relocation choices.  
Finally, I have some evidence that states’ legal systems matter to the 
market for corporate headquarters.  In particular, states with better courts are 
more successful at attracting corporate headquarters.   
In the aggregate, these findings suggest that state competition for 
corporate headquarters may end up shaping state law—including, potentially, 
state corporate law—at least to some extent. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 








 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Firm Size 
     
  Ln (assets) 12468 5.01 1166 4.81 -0.20*** 
  Employ. (in 
thousands) 
11284 3.07 1090 4.11 1.04*** 
  Total liability ($1,000) 12408 286.76 1162 367.18 80.42** 
  
Firm Performance 
     
  Return on equity 12069 0.09 1111 0.06 -0.04 
  Return on assets 12069 0.00 1112 -0.02 -0.02** 
  
Other 
     
  Tobin’s q. 12394 2.53 1154 2.55 0.02 
  Book lev. 12407 0.19 1162 0.21 0.03*** 
  Fin. lev. 12342 0.20 1150 0.20 0.00 
  Tangibility 12149 0.20 1130 0.23 0.03*** 
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Panel B: Excluding relocations that occurred within a year of a merger 








 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean  
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Firm Size 
     
  Ln(assets) 12910 5.01 724 4.73 -0.28*** 
  Employ. (thous.) 11706 3.14 668 3.60 0.46 
  Total liab. ($1,000) 12849 291.81 721 326.33 34.52 
  
Firm Performance 
     
  Return on equity 12487 0.09 693 0.06 -0.03 
  Return on assets 12488 0.00 693 -0.03 -0.04*** 
  
Other 
     
  Tobin’s q. 12831 2.53 717 2.57 0.04 
  Book lev. 12848 0.19 721 0.21 0.02** 
  Fin. lev. 12778 0.20 714 0.20 -0.00 
  Tangibility 12575 0.20 704 0.24 0.04*** 
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Note: Columns 1 and 2 refer to firms that did not change their 
primary-place-of-business state (“PPB state”) between 1994 and 2018.  
Columns 3 and 4 display values for firms that changed their PPB state at 
least once between 1994 and 2018.  Column 5 displays the results of a t-
test. Firms are coded as having relocated if their PPB state in a given year 
is different from their PPB state in the preceding year.  Financial variables 
are defined in Table A.1. * ** *** indicate statistical significance at the 
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Table 2: Absolute Number of Headquarters Relocations by Decade and 
Industry154 
 1994–1999 2000–2009 2010–2019 









Agriculture, Forestry, & 
Fishing 
1 0 1 1 1 1 
Construction and Mining 40 22 35 24 37 23 
Manufacturing 200 107 242 146 161 104 
Transp., 
Communications, 
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary 
Services 
58 29 61 29 32 20 
Trade 43 21 36 20 30 19 
Finance, Industry, and 
Real Estate 
97 60 300 258 238 215 





 154. Note that the industry classifications are based on the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) System.  See Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual, OSHA, 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (defining the SIC 
codes). 
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Table 3: Percentage of Headquarter Relocations by Decade and Industry 
 1994–1999 2000–2009 2010–2019 








Agriculture, Forestry, & 
Fishing 
 0.03 0  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.07 
Construction and Mining  0.09  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.09  0.06 
Manufacturing  0.06  0.03  0.08  0.05  0.07  0.05 
Transp., 
Communications, 
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary 
Services 
 0.07  0.04  0.09  0.04  0.07  0.04 
Trade  0.05  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.04 
Finance, Industry, and 
Real Estate 
 0.04  0.02  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.11 
Services  0.05  0.02  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.05 
  
  
2020] STATE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS 253 
Table 4: Absolute Number of Headquarters of Public Corporations by State 
and Year 
Rank State Number of headquarters in the year… % Change 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 (‘95–’18) 
1 CA 1031 1203 863 664 685 675   -34.53 
2 NY 754 698 599 548 531 515   -31.70 
3 TX 550 523 417 388 420 409   -25.64 
4 MA 421 410 334 269 285 303   -28.03 
5 IL 358 296 335 320 291 247   -31.01 
6 PA 300 293 226 192 187 173   -42.33 
7 NJ 343 303 272 164 168 166   -51.60 
8 FL 299 279 222 151 154 154   -48.49 
9 OH 249 208 157 136 120 116   -53.41 
10 CO 170 145 110 98 118 111   -34.71 
11 VA 160 163 141 115 122 107   -33.13 
12 GA 172 173 131 98 94 99   -42.44 
13 NC 124 125 95 103 98 89   -28.23 
14 CT 189 145 118 90 88 79   -58.20 
15 MD 124 122 97 89 82 77   -37.90 
16 MN 226 191 143 107 87 72   -68.14 
17 WA 102 123 106 78 76 72   -29.41 
18 MI 137 119 98 73 67 69   -49.64 
19 WI 97 77 55 60 63 60   -38.14 
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20 DE 33 29 53 92 64 58   75.76 
21 TN 92 79 68 61 57 58   -36.96 
22 AZ 79 76 61 48 52 54   -31.65 
23 IN 93 89 74 64 61 49   -47.31 
24 MO 110 98 76 71 58 43   -60.91 
25 OK 60 52 36 38 41 37   -38.33 
26 NV 61 43 43 29 31 35   -42.62 
27 UT 50 48 39 34 34 34   -32 
28 LA 47 38 35 31 26 24   -48.94 
29 KS 34 37 29 24 29 23   -32.35 
30 KY 41 46 34 30 26 23   -43.90 
31 IA 53 33 33 23 23 22   -58.49 
32 OR 73 71 48 35 30 21   -71.23 
33 SC 42 37 29 24 23 19   -54.76 
34 AR 29 26 18 16 19 17   -41.38 
35 NE 27 21 23 17 21 17   -37.04 
36 AL 56 50 43 20 17 16   -71.43 
37 DC 18 28 22 12 16 12   -33.33 
38 HI 13 12 9 10 13 11   -15.38 
39 MS 29 21 18 14 11 11   -62.07 
40 RI 18 19 13 12 13 10   -44.44 
41 NH 32 29 23 13 9 9   -71.88 
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42 WV 13 9 12 10 8 8   -38.46 
43 ME 15 15 15 8 8 7   -53.33 
44 SD 9 8 6 7 8 7   -22.22 
45 ID 11 12 11 11 6 6   -45.45 
46 MT 12 8 6 6 6 5   -58.33 
47 ND 6 6 4 3 3 4   -33.33 
48 AK 4 3 2 2 3 3   -25 
49 NM 14 10 5 3 1 3   -78.57 
50 VT 14 10 8 5 4 2   -85.71 
51 WY 6 6 2 4 2 2   -66.67 
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Table 5: Per-Capita Number of Headquarters of Public Corporations by State 
and Year 
Rank State Number of headquarters per one million residents in 
the year… 
% Change 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 (‘95–’18) 
1 DE 45.94 36.88 62.71   102.27 67.99 60.07   30.75 
2 MA 69.45 64.45 52.16 40.97 41.95 44.02   -36.61 
3 NY 41.54 36.73 31.31 28.25 27.02 26.37   -36.52 
4 CT 57.88 42.50 33.65 25.15 24.53 22.12   -61.78 
5 CO 45.48 33.51 23.75 19.42 21.65 19.50   -57.11 
6 IL 30.12 23.81 26.57 24.92 22.63 19.41   -35.55 
7 NJ 43.06 35.94 31.44 18.64 18.94 18.68   -56.62 
8 CA 32.74 35.39 24.09 17.79 17.60 17.11   -47.75 
9 DC 32.65 48.95 38.79 19.83 23.69 17.11   -47.61 
10 TX 29.44 24.97 18.31 15.37 15.29 14.29   -51.48 
11 PA 24.91 23.85 18.15 15.10 14.63 13.51   -45.74 
12 MN 49.07 38.71 27.93 20.15 15.87 12.84   -73.83 
13 MD 24.68 22.97 17.35 15.37 13.70 12.76   -48.32 
14 VA 24.24 22.94 18.61 14.33 14.59 12.59   -48.07 
15 NV 39.98 21.30 17.68 10.73 10.81 11.56   -71.08 
16 UT 25.29 21.39 15.87 12.25 11.40 10.78   -57.37 
17 WI 18.88 14.33  9.92 10.54 10.94 10.33   -45.28 
18 OH 22.32 18.30 13.70 11.79 10.33  9.93   -55.49 
  
2020] STATE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS 257 
19 WA 18.78 20.81 16.94 11.57 10.61  9.57   -49.05 
20 RI 18.20 18.09 12.17 11.39 12.31  9.45   -48.07 
21 GA 23.93 21.03 14.68 10.09  9.24  9.42   -60.64 
22 OK 18.37 15.05 10.14 10.11 10.49  9.39   -48.89 
23 NE 16.51 12.25 13.06  9.29 11.10  8.83   -46.53 
24 NC 17.26 15.47 10.91 10.76  9.77  8.57   -50.32 
25 TN 17.55 13.85 11.35  9.60  8.65  8.57   -51.21 
26 SD 12.36 10.58  7.74  8.58  9.37  7.97   -35.54 
27 KS 13.14 13.74 10.56  8.40  9.97  7.90   -39.89 
28 HI 11.01  9.89  6.96  7.33  9.14  7.74   -29.69 
29 AZ 18.34 14.73 10.45  7.49  7.61  7.54   -58.87 
30 IN 16.06 14.61 11.79  9.86  9.23  7.32   -54.42 
31 FL 21.08 17.39 12.44  8.01  7.62  7.25   -65.61 
32 MO 20.66 17.48 13.13 11.84  9.55  7.02   -66.00 
33 IA 18.66 11.27 11.13  7.54  7.37  6.99   -62.55 
34 MI 14.18 11.96  9.75  7.39  6.75  6.91   -51.27 
35 NH 27.93 23.39 17.71  9.87  6.73  6.65   -76.19 
36 AR 11.69  9.71  6.47  5.48  6.38  5.65   -51.69 
37 ND  9.35  9.35  6.19  4.45  3.98  5.28   -43.58 
38 ME 12.12 11.75 11.37  6.03  6.02  5.23   -56.87 
39 KY 10.63 11.36  8.13  6.90  5.87  5.16   -51.52 
40 LA 10.86  8.50  7.65  6.82  5.57  5.15   -52.57 
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41 OR 23.24 20.70 13.28  9.12  7.47  5.02   -78.39 
42 MT 13.82  8.85  6.38  6.06  5.82  4.71   -65.88 
43 WV  7.14  4.98  6.59  5.39  4.34  4.43   -37.91 
44 AK  6.65  4.78  3.00  2.80  4.07  4.08   -38.65 
45 SC 11.35  9.19  6.79  5.18  4.70  3.74   -67.08 
46 MS 10.78  7.37  6.19  4.71  3.68  3.69   -65.76 
47 WY 12.54 12.14  3.89  7.09  3.42  3.46   -72.39 
48 ID  9.44  9.23  7.70  7.00  3.63  3.43   -63.70 
49 AL 13.14 11.23  9.41  4.18  3.50  3.27   -75.08 
50 VT 24.02 16.40 12.88  7.99  6.40  3.20   -86.66 
51 NM  8.32  5.49  2.59  1.45  0.48  1.43   -82.77 
Note: The rank in column 1 is based on state’s percentage of the total 
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Table 6: Market Capitalization of Headquarters of Public Corporations by 
State and Year 
Rank State Market capitalization in $ trillion for headquartered 
corporations in the year… 
% 
Change 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 (‘95–
’18) 
1 CA  0.86  3.27  2.58  2.86  5.10  6.81   691.33 
2 NY  1.10  3.58  3.15  2.58  3.34  3.58   225.11 
3 TX  0.53  1.33  1.53  1.78  2.01  2.10   295.11 
4 WA  0.12  0.61  0.57  0.48  1.09  2.09   1620.66 
5 IL  0.50  0.71  0.83  0.84  1.18  1.40   181.31 
6 NJ  0.33  0.84  0.70  0.66  1.01  1.18   263.51 
7 MA  0.27  0.69  0.42  0.48  0.77  1.06   290.84 
8 GA  0.28  0.62  0.47  0.47  0.81  0.88   218.48 
9 OH  0.23  0.37  0.49  0.47  0.72  0.77   236.37 
10 MN  0.17  0.31  0.47  0.43  0.60  0.74   338.61 
11 PA  0.28  0.27  0.42  0.46  0.71  0.72   158.83 
12 NC  0.10  0.28  0.48  0.38  0.57  0.64   532.70 
13 NE  0.06  0.14  0.19  0.27  0.44  0.64   996.09 
14 VA  0.17  0.24  0.33  0.37  0.73  0.58   237.90 
15 FL  0.11  0.15  0.28  0.26  0.46  0.55   403.63 
16 CT  0.31  0.65  0.63  0.42  0.74  0.48   53.76 
17 MI  0.20  0.19  0.26  0.29  0.38  0.44   123.44 
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18 IN  0.07  0.17  0.22  0.17  0.30  0.37   429.95 
19 AR  0.07  0.29  0.25  0.24  0.26  0.33   391.35 
20 MD  0.06  0.14  0.17  0.16  0.25  0.32   431.51 
21 CO  0.08  0.18  0.18  0.20  0.27  0.25   216.29 
22 TN  0.05  0.11  0.14  0.13  0.24  0.24   348.89 
23 MO  0.13  0.30  0.20  0.23  0.31  0.24   87.61 
24 WI  0.05  0.09  0.12  0.12  0.15  0.19   289.37 
25 AZ  0.05  0.03  0.09  0.17  0.13  0.19   310.86 
26 OR  0.04  0.09  0.05  0.08  0.16  0.15   244.90 
27 OK  0.02  0.05  0.09  0.15  0.13  0.15   593.36 
28 RI  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.15  0.12   416.64 
29 KY  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.10  0.12   161.11 
30 NV  0.02  0.02  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.11   351.60 
31 DC  0.06  0.12  0.10  0.05  0.09  0.10   50.21 
32 ID  0.03  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.08   154.37 
33 LA  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06   126.35 
34 IA  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.06   45.05 
35 KS  0.02  0.12  0.09  0.03  0.05  0.06   195.65 
36 UT  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.05   150.68 
37 DE  0.08  0.12  0.09  0.16  0.21  0.05   -40.78 
38 AL  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.04  0.05   39.99 
39 SC  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03   97.59 
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40 ME  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.02  0.02   571.71 
41 MS  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02   36.20 
42 HI  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01   240.63 
43 NH  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01   17.71 
44 SD  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01   312.70 
45 WV  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01   294.97 
46 ND  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01   597.84 
47 MT  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01   170.63 
48 AK  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00   582.32 
49 NM  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00   -50.83 
50 VT  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   -44.28 
51 WY  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   102.50 
Note: A state’s rank (column 1) is based on the market capitalization of 
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Table 7: Per-Capita Market Capitalization of Headquartered Corporations 
by State and Year 
Rank State Market capitalization in $ million per resident in the 
year… 
% Change 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 (‘95–’18) 
1 NE  0.04  0.08  0.11  0.15  0.23  0.33   830.75 
2 WA  0.02  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.15  0.28   1142.04 
3 NY  0.06  0.19  0.16  0.13  0.17  0.18   202.14 
4 CA  0.03  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.13  0.17   531.55 
5 MA  0.04  0.11  0.07  0.07  0.11  0.15   244.26 
6 DC  0.12  0.20  0.18  0.08  0.14  0.14   18.03 
7 CT  0.10  0.19  0.18  0.12  0.21  0.14   40.58 
8 NJ  0.04  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.11  0.13   225.86 
9 MN  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.11  0.13   260.31 
10 RI  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.14  0.12   382.92 
11 AR  0.03  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.11   304.89 
12 IL  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.11   162.77 
13 GA  0.04  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.08  0.08   117.81 
14 TX  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07   157.81 
15 VA  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.07   162.38 
16 OH  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.07   221.36 
17 NC  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.06   337.91 
18 PA  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.06   143.54 
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19 IN  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.06   358.43 
20 MD  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.05   342.38 
21 DE  0.11  0.15  0.10  0.18  0.23  0.05   -55.95 
22 CO  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04   107.74 
23 MI  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04   116.18 
24 ID  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.04   69.29 
25 MO  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04   63.18 
26 OK  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04   474.63 
27 NV  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04   127.60 
28 TN  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.04   247.44 
29 OR  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.04   159.09 
30 WI  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03   244.42 
31 AZ  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.03   147.21 
32 KY  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03   125.65 
33 FL  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.03   236.29 
34 KS  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02   162.70 
35 IA  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02   30.87 
36 ME  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.02   520.74 
37 UT  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02   57.14 
38 SD  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01   242.04 
39 LA  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01   110.23 
40 NH  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01   -0.37 
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41 HI  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01   183.06 
42 AL  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01   22.09 
43 ND  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01   490.57 
44 AK  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01   458.14 
45 MS  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01   22.94 
46 SC  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01   43.80 
47 MT  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01   121.61 
48 WV  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   298.53 
49 VT  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   -47.99 
50 NM  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   -60.47 
51 WY  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   67.73 
Note: A state’s rank (col. 1) is based on the per capital market 
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Table 8: Net Relocations as Percentage of Existing Number of 
Headquarters 
    
 1995–2000 2000–2009 2010–2018 
 1 SD 10.42 DE 64.16 NV 15.71 
 2 ID  7.74 MT 17.76 SD 13.13 
 3 CO  5.11 AZ 17.76 NE 10.53 
 4 AZ  3.69 RI  7.03 NH 10.24 
 5 NH  3.01 TX  5.53 VA  9.54 
 6 WA  2.71 MS  5.39 TX  8.58 
 7 TN  2.28 GA  5.17 RI  8.52 
 8 RI 0 OH  2.97 HI  8.49 
 9 NM 0 MO  2.53 NC  8.41 
 10 WV 0 AL  2.43 CO  7.10 
 11 ME 0 NC  1.94 AZ  6.13 
 12 AK 0 TN  1.45 AR  5.66 
 13 TX -0.88 VA  1.42 GA  5.15 
 14 WI -1.09 CT  0.83 IN  4.99 
 15 IL -1.39 PA  0.41 MI  4.38 
 16 GA -2.19 WY 0 OR  3.35 
 17 KY -2.27 NE 0 WI  3.32 
 18 CA -2.76 HI 0 FL  2.69 
 19 AR -3.31 KS 0 PA  1.67 
 20 FL -3.75 NV 0 AL 0 
 21 PA -3.84 MN 0 AK 0 
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 22 IN -4.12 AR 0 ND 0 
 23 NJ -4.15 VT 0 SC 0 
 24 OH -4.44 SC 0 NM 0 
 25 NC -4.70 MD -0.98 DC 0 
 26 MN -4.78 MI -1.00 VT 0 
 27 OK -5.23 IN -1.30 KY 0 
 28 MD -5.31 WI -1.58 OK 0 
 29 AL -5.40 FL -2.67 NJ -1.22 
 30 MO -5.59 CA -3.13 CA -1.34 
 31 IA -5.78 OR -3.70 MO -1.68 
 32 MI -5.87 OK -4.68 TN -1.70 
 33 MA -5.89 WA -4.78 WA -2.60 
 34 NY -6.25 KY -5.21 CT -4.64 
 35 OR -6.58 CO -6.84 OH -4.80 
 36 SC -6.82 MA -6.87 UT -6.03 
 37 VA -7.00 ME -7.47 IL -6.53 
 38 NV -7.07 NY -8.53 MN -7.56 
 39 UT -7.15 ID -9.05 MS -8.22 
 40 VT -7.19 WV -9.51 MD -8.42 
 41 NE -7.42 IA -9.74 IA -9.19 
 42 DC -8.68 NJ   -10.45 MA -9.28 
 43 MT -9.17 LA   -11.31 ID   -11.64 
 44 CT   -10.16 SD   -14.53 WV   -12.05 
 45 KS   -11.14 NM   -14.56 NY   -13.97 
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 46 MS   -11.43 NH   -18.55 LA   -14.71 
 47 ND   -13.82 ND   -20.54 KS   -18.46 
 48 LA   -14.82 UT   -21.00 DE   -26.93 
 49 HI   -15.97 IL   -22.61 ME   -27.16 
 50 WY   -16.36 AK -40 MT   -31.46 
 51 DE   -18.23 DC   -43.63 WY   -60.47 
Note: Percentages are calculated by dividing the difference between 
relocations into a state and relocations out of a state by the average number 
of firms headquartered in the relevant state during the pertinent decade. 
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Table 9: Net Relocations by State and Decade 
    
 1995–2000 2000–2009 2010–2018 
 1 CO 9 DE 39 TX 35 
 2 WA 3 TX 24 VA 11 
 3 AZ 3 AZ 11 CO 8 
 4 TN 2 GA 7 NC 8 
 5 ID 1 OH 5 NV 5 
 6 NH 1 VA 2 GA 5 
 7 SD 1 MO 2 FL 4 
 8 RI 0 NC 2 PA 3 
 9 WV 0 TN 1 MI 3 
 10 AK 0 MT 1 IN 3 
 11 ME 0 MS 1 AZ 3 
 12 NM 0 AL 1 WI 2 
 13 ND -1 CT 1 NE 2 
 14 WI -1 RI 1 RI 1 
 15 KY -1 PA 1 HI 1 
 16 MT -1 HI 0 OR 1 
 17 AR -1 NE 0 NH 1 
 18 WY -1 NV 0 SD 1 
 19 VT -1 KS 0 AR 1 
 20 HI -2 MN 0 KY 0 
 21 DC -2 SC 0 NM 0 
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 22 NE -2 WY 0 OK 0 
 23 IA -3 VT 0 VT 0 
 24 SC -3 AR 0 ND 0 
 25 MS -3 NM -1 DC 0 
 26 OK -3 ID -1 SC 0 
 27 AL -3 MI -1 AK 0 
 28 UT -4 IN -1 AL 0 
 29 NV -4 WV -1 WV -1 
 30 KS -4 WI -1 MS -1 
 31 IN -4 SD -1 ID -1 
 32 GA -4 AK -1 MO -1 
 33 TX -5 MD -1 TN -1 
 34 IL -5 ME -1 IA -2 
 35 OR -5 ND -1 UT -2 
 36 NC -6 OR -2 MT -2 
 37 DE -6 KY -2 WA -2 
 38 MO -6 OK -2 NJ -2 
 39 LA -7 IA -3 ME -2 
 40 MD -7 LA -4 WY -2 
 41 MI -8 NH -4 LA -4 
 42 MN -11 WA -5 CT -4 
 43 OH -11 FL -6 KS -5 
 44 FL -12 CO -8 OH -6 
 45 VA -12 UT -8 MN -7 
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 46 PA -12 DC -10 MD -7 
 47 NJ -14 MA -23 CA -9 
 48 CT -19 NJ -28 IL -19 
 49 MA -25 CA -29 DE -20 
 50 CA -31 NY -52 MA -26 
 51 NY -48 IL -72 NY -74 
Note: In cols. 3, 5, & 7 positive numbers mean that the number of 
relocations to the state exceeds the number of relocations from the state to 
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Table 10: Headquarters Relocations in and out of States by Decade and 
State 
State 1994–1999 2000–2009 2010–2018 
 In Out In Out In Out 
AK 0 0 0 1 0 0 
AL 2 5 5 4 1 1 
AR 0 1 3 3 1 0 
AZ 11 8 16 5 15 12 
CA 69 100 65 94 48 57 
CO 31 22 17 25 24 16 
CT 15 34 29 28 12 16 
DC 3 5 3 13 4 4 
DE 10 16 69 30 10 30 
FL 31 43 34 40 18 14 
GA 16 20 24 17 15 10 
HI 0 2 0 0 1 0 
IA 2 5 0 3 1 3 
ID 1 0 2 3 0 1 
IL 17 22 32 104 50 69 
IN 4 8 6 7 5 2 
KS 4 8 7 7 1 6 
KY 4 5 2 4 1 1 
LA 2 9 4 8 1 5 
MA 27 52 48 71 41 67 
MD 11 18 17 18 9 16 
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ME 0 0 3 4 0 2 
MI 12 20 12 13 7 4 
MN 6 17 13 13 7 14 
MO 3 9 9 7 4 5 
MS 1 4 4 3 0 1 
MT 1 2 1 0 0 2 
NC 9 15 24 22 25 17 
ND 0 1 0 1 0 0 
NE 1 3 4 4 3 1 
NH 4 3 4 8 3 2 
NJ 34 48 57 85 24 26 
NM 4 4 0 1 1 1 
NV 5 9 10 10 8 3 
NY 71 119 149 201 85 159 
OH 9 20 11 6 8 14 
OK 2 5 4 6 3 3 
OR 1 6 6 8 2 1 
PA 30 42 24 23 21 18 
RI 3 3 1 0 1 0 
SC 3 6 0 0 3 3 
SD 2 1 0 1 2 1 
TN 12 10 10 9 3 4 
TX 46 51 55 31 72 37 
UT 4 8 2 10 4 6 
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VA 14 26 16 14 23 12 
VT 1 2 1 1 0 0 
WA 8 5 6 11 5 7 
WI 3 4 6 7 4 2 
WV 1 1 2 3 0 1 
WY 0 1 2 2 0 2 
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Table 11: Firm-level Determinants of the Decision to Relocate: Probit 
Model 
  
Dependent variable: domestic relocation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Effective Tax 
Rate 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




-0.000* -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size  
 
      





   (0.009) (0.000) (0.010)  







   (0.010) (0.000) (0.011)  
  Total 
Liabilities 
($1,000) 
  0.000** 0.000** 0.000  
  




  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
  Return on 
Equity 
    0.000  
     (0.000)  
  Return on 
Assets 
    -0.027*  
     (0.014)  
Other  
 
      
  Tobin’s q.     -0.006  
     (0.006)  
  Book lev.     0.241***  
     (0.045)  
Financial lev.     0.022  
     (0.075)  
Observations 114584 114584 106816 106816 106027 114584 
Pseudo-R sq. 0.001  0.008  0.014 0.001 
Chi sq. 3.446  66.472  122.250 3.446 
Note: Probit regression.  The sample includes all firm-year 
observations from 1994 to 2018.  All regressions use robust standard errors 
and cluster at the firm level.  All covariates are lagged by one year.  
Financial variables are defined in Table A.1. * ** *** indicate statistical 
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Table 12: Firm-level Determinants of Reincorporation Choices: Fixed-
effects Logit Model 
  
Dependent Variable: Domestic Relocation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Effective Tax Rate 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.010) 
Ln (Property, Plant, 
Equipment) 
-0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size  
 
      
  Ln (Assets)   -0.009 -0.002 -0.026  
   (0.072) (0.017) (0.084)  







   (0.077) (0.018) (0.077)  
  Total Liabilities 
($1,000) 
  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Firm Performance 
  
      
  Return on Equity     0.002  
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     (0.002)  
  Return on Assets     0.015  
     (0.096)  
Other  
 
      
  Tobin’s q.     -0.018  
     (0.012)  
  Book lev.     0.235  
     (0.145)  
  Financial lev.     0.594*  
     (0.328)  
Observations 9361 9361 8617 8617 8554 9361 
Pseudo-R sq. 0.001  0.004  0.009 0.001 
Chi sq. 3.566  15.771  47.950 3.566 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Fixed-effects logit regressions.  The sample includes all firm-
year observations from 1994 to 2018.  All regressions include firm fixed-
effects and use bootstrapped standard errors.  All covariates are lagged by 
one year.  * ** *** indicate statistical significance at the one percent, five 
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Table 13: Determinants of States’ Success in the Market for Corporate 
Headquarters 
  
Dependent Variable: Net Number of Firms Relocating in a 
State in a Given Year 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) 
Court Quality Rank 0.036** 0.035** 0.038**    
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)    
Corporate Income 
Tax Rate 
   0.018 -0.047 0.001 
    (0.235) (0.204) (0.222) 
Other State-Level 
Variables 
      
  -0.779* -0.679  -0.825* -0.731 
  Number of Firms 
in the State 
 (0.404) (0.483)  (0.418) (0.476) 
  -0.001* -0.001*  -0.001* -0.001 
  Population  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
       
  State GDP  0.000** 0.000**  0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
  Median Book 
Leverage 
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   3.266*   1.786 
  Median Financial 
Leverage 
  (1.774)   (1.929) 
   -0.474   0.323 
  Median ln 
(Assets) 
  (0.839)   (0.919) 
       
  Median ROA   -0.236   -0.106 
   (0.286)   (0.254) 
  Median Tobin’s 
q. 
  0.449   0.943 
   (1.761)   (1.459) 
  Effective Tax 
Rate 
      
   0.034   0.311 
  Property, Plant, 
Equip. 
  (0.352)   (0.356) 
   0.037   0.046 
Observations   (0.044)   (0.046) 
R sq.       
Adjusted R sq.   -0.000*   -0.000 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Fixed effects model.  Years 2002–2018.  The dependent 
variable is the number of net relocations to the state in a given year, defined 
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as the number of firms moving their PPB into the state minus the number 
of firms moving their PPB out of the state.  All regressions use robust 
standard errors and cluster at the region level.  All covariates are lagged by 
one year.  Financial variables are defined in Table A.1. * ** *** indicate 
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Table A.1: Financial Variables and Firm Age 
Variable Definition Compustat Codes 
Assets Total Assets at 
Effective tax rate Total income 
taxes/pretax income 
txt/pi 
Employees Employees (in 
thousands) 
ln(emp) 
Financial leverage Total debt over (sum 




Market capitalization Number of common 
stock times share price 
at the end of the fiscal 
year 
prcc_f *csho 




Return on equity (ROE) Operating income 
before depreciation 
over common equity 
oibdp/ceq 
Tobin’s q (Assets minus common 
equity plus market 
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Total liabilities Sum of debt in current 
liabilities and long-
term debt  
dlc+dltt 




   
 
 
 
